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My purpose in this paper is to examine current practices and trends in
defense contracting with a view to establishing what factors are re-
sponsible for the performance results obtained and how improved per-
formance might be secured. In particular, I will emphasize the incen-
tives that are experienced by defense contractors and government con-
tracting agencies in negotiating and executing defense contracts. My
analysis of these relations leads me to conclude that neither the manipula-
tion of profit incentives .nor the monitoring of contract progress can be
expected, in any dependable sense, to yield significant improvements in
contract performance as long as the specification of the task remains
unchanged. From a contractual point of view at least, the "systems
approach" to weapons procurement which has prevailed since 1953 1
appearsto be distinctly suboptimal. Whether this is true when viewed
more generally will not be a principal concern of mine here, although
this issue will be considered at least tangentially in my concluding re-
marks.
Investigations of defense contracting ordinarily take the existing pro-
curement strategy and institutional arrangements as given.2 This is the
assumption employed in Sections I—Ill of this paper where I examine
current performance results, the attributes of cost-plus-fixed-fee con-
1CarlKaysen considers 1953 to be the year in which the systems approach
came into general use as the preferred strategy in weapons procurement. "Im-
proving the Efficiency of Military Research and Development," in Public Policy,
1963, ed. by Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris, Cambridge, Mass., 1963,
p. 233.
2Anotable exception is the study by Kaysen, "Improving the Efficiency of
Military Research and Development."218 InstitutionalStructures and Defense Spending
tracts, and the effects of incentive-fee arrangements. I continue to
assume that institutional arrangements are unchanged but relax the
assumption of a fixed procurement strategy in Section IV. There I
argue that a much more fundamental way by which to improve defense
contracting is to decompose the task into technically separable
ponents. The complimentarities between contractural strategies and re-
search, development, and production strategies are also indicated. The
argument is summarized in Section V.
I. Economic Performance in the Defense Industries
Principal among the performance dimensions by which an industry is
evaluated are efficiency, equity, stability, and technical progress. Since
my concern here is not with technical progress as such but with progress
per dollar of expenditure, I take as given that progress is occurring and
emphasize instead the efficiency aspect of this performance. Equity is
mainly concerned with income distribution objectives. Inasmuch as
reasonably tight controls over profits and conspicuous expenditure items
(salaries, emoluments, and so on)are typically imposed on defense
contractors, I assume that equity performance, in some gross sense at
least, is satisfactory. Thus the present study emphasizes the efficiency
and stability objectives of performance.
Unsatisfactory efficiency performance has been noted recently by Kay-
senand Peck and Schererand has been indicated by previous investi-
gators as well.° Although some of the reasons why efficiency perform-
ance has been unsatisfactory have gone undetected, at this point I
merely accept the judgment that the efficiency goal requires attention
and develop the reasons why this might be so in subsequent sections of
the paper.
The stability performance of the defense industries has received less
explicit attention, although it has often been observed that the varia-
Frederick M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic In-
centives, Boston, Mass., 1964, p. 205.
Kaysen, "Improving the Efficiency of Military Research and Development,"
pp. 261—262.
See Merton J. Peck and Frederick M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition
Process: An Economic Analysis, Boston, Mass., 1964, pp. 593—594, and Scherer,
The Weapons Acquisition Process, pp. 314—315.
6Forexample, John Perry Miller, Pricing of Military Procurements, New
Haven, Conn., 1949.Defense Contracts: Incentives & Performance 219
bility in sales and employment within individual firms over time has
seemed unnecessarily high, considering the over-all stability of expendi-
tures on weapons and space development and procurement. However,
the stability statistics on sales and employment have never really been
developed. A rough of this performance can be obtained by
fitting a least-squares-linear-trend line to the annual sales and employ-
ment histories of the principal firms in the aerospace industry and the
industry aggregate, as well as for firms of comparable size in four other
producers goods industries, over the period 1954—1963. The standard
deviation of the residuals was then computed and, dividing by the mean
level of activity, my measure of variability is the coefficient of variation
of the residuals.7 The results are reported in theAppendixand are
summarized in Table 1.
As is quickly apparent from an inspection of column 2, Table 1, both
the sales variability and the employment variability for the principal
firms in the aerospace industry were higher than the corresponding vari-
abilities among the principal firms in the four other industries. However,
as column 6 reveals, the amount of sales variability for the aerospace
industry taken as a whole was also higher than in every industry other
than steel, and the amount of employment variability in the aerospace
industry was higher than in each of the other industries for which this
figure could be obtained. If the level of industry variability is taken as
indicative of the level of "natural" variability imposed on the firms in
the industry, then firm variability should not be considered excessive
unless some correction is made for the amount of industry variability
experienced.
As is shown in the Appendix, it is possible to devise a measure by
which the total amount of firm variability can be corrected for an in-
dustry effect. It is necessary, however, to take a complete census of the
entire industry in order to make the separation. The cost of doing this
would be prohibitive in relation to the needs of the present study. As
also shown in the Appendix, however, an approximate correction for
the industry effect can nevertheless be obtained. The adjusted estimates
Alinear trend is a rough approximation. For the short interval that we are
concerned with here, it provided a generally close fit.It is of some interest to
note that my correction for trend and analysis of variability is similar to the
technique employed by C. E. Ferguson in his study of employment stability in
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Defense Contracts: Incentives & Performance 221
areshown in column 4 of Table 1. These corrected stability statistics
display substantially the same relations as the unadjusted ones: varia-
bility of sales and employment among the principal firms in the aero-
space industry is higher than those found in each of the other four
industries examined.
It can be argued that variability per se is not necessarily undesirable.
It may be that the nature of the task makes high variability a natural
result and that it would be very expensive to eliminate it. I return to this
issue in Section IV. It is also possible that variability has a therapeutic
effect. By confronting the firm with occasional adversity, cost reductions
of a fundamental sort might be secured that would not be obtained
otherwise.8 But surely the claims of therapeutic effects require qualifica-
tion as they apply to the defense industries where the government regards
evidence of excess capacity as favorable to contract awards; if adversity
is known to be transitory, the incentive to achieve cost corrections is
attenuated and the alleged therapeuticeffectsare correspondingly
weaker. Thus, unless task characteristics naturally impose a high level of
variability on the firms in the defense industries, so that large systems
are necessarily contracted for as units and go through a regular cycle of
initiation, rapid growth, peaking, and tailing-off, the high degree of
variability observed in the aerospace industry would appear to be with-
out justification. In short, it imposes obvious costs and—task require-
ments aside—no obvious benefits. This study will therefore proceed as
if both efficiency and stability performance in the defense industries
leave something to be desired; the question of task requirements is de-
ferred to Section IV.
I!. Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Contracts
There appear to be three criteria by which defense contracts are awarded:
the capability of the contractor, his reputation, and the merits of the
proposal. The contractor's capability is measured in terms of his stock
of plant and skills. Since previous investment in either equipment or
personnel adds to this stock, the prospects that the firm will be awarded
contracts in the future can be improved by expenditures of both kinds.
Such investments will be further reinforced if evidence of the firm's
8Forevidence in favor of this proposition see 0. E. Williamson, The Economics
of Discretionary Behavior, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964, Chapter 6.222 Institutional Structures and Defense Spending
unused capacity, relative to that of its rivals, weighs favorably in the
evaluation of capability.
Capability, which is a measure of the contractor's existing capacity
to undertake and complete a task, should be distinguished from his
reputation. The latter is concerned with the efficiency and quality of per-
formance of work that the contractor has done previously. Previous cost
experience is, of course, an element of reputation; but for a given level
of quality, costs in defense work can vary over a wide range and still be
considered admissible. Under a systems approach to weapons procure-
ment, technical uncertainties are generally too great and change orders
too numerous to assign cost-performance evaluations with confidence.
Thus, as I will argue, and as has been observed elsewhere, present
practices make it difficult to assign penalties for cost overruns.9
The technical merits of the proposal (together with the skill with
which it is presented) constitute the third criterion. In contract awards
of the magnitude typically involved in the defense industries, much
talent and expense go into the preparation and packaging of the pro-
posal, this being the "major instrument of salesmanship in the competi-
tion for contracts." 10
If, as I have suggested, cost performance is difficult to measure, and if,
in addition, this efficiency criterion often conflicts with other objectives,
a natural displacement of cost performance considerations in favor of
other considerations tends frequently to occur. My purpose here is to
examine in more detail the incentives and related conditions that have
combined to produce this result. I begin with the cost-plus-fixed-fee
(CPFF) contract, which (although no longer much used in procuring
major systems) has been used often in the past and serves as a convenient
starting point for my analysis.
The overriding justification of CPFF contracts is that of cost un-
certainty. A degree of uncertainty pervades all R-and-D work, and early
production runs frequently involve product modifications and technique
developments that render cost estimation on these items difficult. These
conditions are well known and hardly require elaboration here. What I
want to call attention to is that it is not merely cost uncertainty, but un-
certainty together with large size, that is responsible for the large finan-
cial risk associated with defense contracts. Were it possible to pool risks
9 Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process, Chapter 4, especially p. 101.
10 Kaysen, "Improving the Efficiency of Military Research," p. 237.Defense Contracts: incentives & Performance 223
by distributing the firm's efforts across a variety of projects instead of on
only a few, then, by the standard theorems on portfolio selection," the
risk of ruin could be reduced significantly. If, however, systems are con-
tracted for as a unit rather than by separable components, the financial
risk remains high and contractors have been reluctant to bear it.
It would be possible, of course, through the prospect of large profits,
to overcome the firm's aversion to heavy financial risk. But the Services
are particularly sensitive to public and congressional criticism when
contractors earn large profits,12 and thus the Services have been tin-
willing to offset the variance inherent in large weapons programs by in-
creasing the expected return. A natural way out of the dilemma is to
adopt a CPFF contract.'3 The risk of ruin is removed so that the con-
11 For a concise statement of theadvantages of diversification,see Jack
Hirshleifer,"InvestmentApproachesUnderUncertainty—Choice—Theoretic
Approaches," Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1965, pp. 518—520.
Briefly the argument can be summarized by examining the following expression
for the variance of a sum:
Var(x1 + x2) =Var(x1)+ Var(x2) + 2 Cov(x1,x2).
For convenience, let the variance of x1 and x2 be equal and given by cr12.Now
Cov(x1, x2) =pa pa-12, wherep is the coefficient of correlation, so that our
variance expression becomes:
Var(x1 + x2) =2(1+
If only one type of program is undertaken so that x1x2 and p =1,we have
Var(x1 + x2) = If two different programs are undertaken that are positively
but not perfectly correlated, we have < Var(x1 + x2) <40.i2. If the two
programs are independent, p =0and Var(x1 + x2) =2a-,2. Finally,if the two
programs are negatively correlated, Var(x, + x2) <2or,2, becoming zero when
p =—1.
It might be argued that the decision to undertake a single, large program is
not properly viewed as selecting an x1 and x2 for which pisunity. This is
correct. The coefficient of correlation between the parts of a single program,
however,is probably high by comparison with that which typically prevails
between separate (independent?) programs.
For an interesting use of this type of argument as it applies to conglomerate
mergers,see M. A. Adelman, "The Antimerger Act,1950—60," American
Economic Review, May 1961, pp. 241—242.
12 Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process,p. 225; the hostility of Congress
to "excess profits" is also noted by Kaysen, "Improving the Efficiency of Military
Research," p. 249.
'3 Even if the Services were able to offer a sufficiently high risk premium
to induce contractors to accept fixed-price contracts, the CPFF contract might
rationally be preferred, considering the government's superior ability to bear
risk. See Kenneth J. Arrow, "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention," in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, ed. by Richard R.
Nelson, Princeton University Press for National Bureau of Economic Research,
1962, pp. 613—614.224 Institutional Structures and Defense Spending
tractor is protected. At the same time, moderate profits—but no more
than moderate profits—are assured, and the Services are also protected.
Assume for the moment that decomposition of the task into many
subtasks is technically feasible at zero or low cost. (This assumption is
discussed below in Section IV.) Assume also that whenever uncertainty
can be avoided at zero cost it will be. If both these assumptions are cor-
rect, why has task decomposition failed to occur? The answer suggested
here is that the conventional assumption that uncertainty is undesirable
fails to hold for defense contracting. It will be argued that the Services
and the contractors both accept task uncertainty because of the bene-
ficial consequences that each associates with
Fundamental to this argument is the proposition that decision-makers
attempt to maintain options in the form of opportunities for discretion
which permit them to pursue their individual and collective interests.
The necessary condition for discretion to exist is that a wide range of
behavior can be represented defensibly. Defensibility can be secured if,
in the nature of the task, a wide range of outcomes are ex ante possible.
And nonuniqueness will result if the task is defined in such a way as to
preserve substantial uncertainty. Thus uncertainty becomes desirable for
the defensibility and the subsequent opportunities to exercise discretion
that it provides.
But uncertainty ordinarily produces negative consequences also; risk
aversion serves to limit the appetite for uncertainty. However the special
institutional arrangements which exist between the Services and their
contractors permit contractual adaptations that suppress (and, in the
given limit, substantially eliminate) these risk conditions. From the
standpoint of both the contractors and the Services, the CPFF contract
represents a particularly successful adaptation to risk.
The existence of uncertainty has the advantage to the contractor that
it is difficult to assess efficiency-reputation effects with any degree of
confidence, while the cost-reimbursable features of the CPFF contract
make it attractive to increase current expenditures on items that yield
14 emphasis throughout is on task uncertainty. It should be recognized,
however, that there are other types of uncertainties that are associated with
defense work. Among these is "program" uncertainty, which arises over the
possibility that a program will be canceled. Unlike task uncertainty, program
uncertainty has, from the standpoint of the contractor, no beneficial consequences
associated with it and hence contractors display the usual aversion to uncertainty
of this kind.Defense Contracts: Incentives & Performance 225
satisfaction. That is, not only will current expenditures be reimbursed,
but the inability to assess cost-effectiveness means that future contract
evaluations will be substantially unaffected by any overrun costs that are
incurred. Hence the contractor has the incentive to expand those ex-
penditures that improve his future capability, particularly investment in
plant and personnel. There is likewise an incentive to relax any burden-
some on-the-job pressures designed to achieve operating cost economies,
for, under a CPFF contract, in terms of forgone profits, the cost of
relaxing pressure is effectively zero. The argument is simply an applica-
tion of the principle that when the relative price of commodity is re-
duced, more of the commodity will ordinarily be consumed. Similarly,
when the penalty for relaxing an effort which yields individual disutility
is reduced, less effort of this sort will be forthcoming.
The difficulty of assessing cost-performance reputation effects, and
therefore the difficulty of assigning penalties, deserves further discussion.
These difficulties arise from the variety of factors that, in principle, can
contribute to large cost overruns on contracts that involve uncertainty
and extend over a period of years.. Typically these factors have two
characteristics: their existence is easy to establish qualitatively but diffi-
cult to estimate quantitatively. Price and wage changes are among the
factors making for uncertainty, as also are changes in technology that
may give rise to revised systems requirements of indeterminate cost.
But even if neither of these types of changes occurred, the very existence
of substantial cost uncertainties at the inception of the task may be in-
voked as the reason for the overrun. As long as cost overruns, for what-
ever reason, can be made "defensible," penalties for previous cost ëx-
cesses will be difficult to assign.
As indicated above, cost-reimbursement type contracts in which over-
run penalties are weak or lacking will produce two effects: there are
incentives to expand those expenditures that improve the contractor's
future capability and to relax any burdensome on-the-job pressures de-
signed to achieve operating cost economies. Of these effects, the one
that I wish to emphasize is the tendency to expand "investment" type
expenses and thereby improve capabilities. These effects are investigated
in more detail in Section III. Very briefly, I argue that wherever the
prospects of future contract awards are enhanced by currently expanding
technical staff and by acquiring technical experience, present staff ex-
penditures will be increased accordingly. More precisely, a firm will226 Institutional Structures and Defense Spending
employ additional personnel up to the point at which the discounted
value of current and expected future benefits is equal to its current
marginal cost.'5 Under CPFF contracts current marginal cost is zero.
The government reimburses the whole of these expenses and the con-
tractor bears none of the cost. Although this is actually an overstatement,
for cost constraints are sometimes invoked and some 'types of expenses
may be disallowed, staff may be expanded enormously, with a tendency
to favor in-house R and D rather than to contract the work out. In
support of this, Scherer observes that there is a tendency to hoard
engineers, technicians, skilled production workers, and administrative
personnel not required on current contracts but useful for winning and
executing future contracts. ...Performingwork "in house" which could
be done more efficiently by specialist vendors is another means...of
building up new capabilities for future business. Engaging in technical tasks
and buying equipment essentially unrelated to an ongoing development
effort also enhances an organization's ability to compete in new fields for
profitable future contracts.16
The fact that this expansion of staff and in-house capability provides
the contractor with the type of advantages described is evidenced by the
high frequency with which the Services use differences in capability
(prior investment in the stock of plant and skills) as grounds for justify-
ing negotiation rather than competitive bidding in awarding procure-
ment contracts. As Hall and Johnson have observed, negotiations of this
type tend to produce a "locked-in" effect, where the award of the con-
tract is no longer an issue but only its terms. They go on to note that in
1964 the AirForceused capability-related differences to justify the
award by negotiation rather than competitive bidding of 52 per cent of
its new contract obligations for components procurements and 95 per
cent of its new contract procurements of complete weapons
Consider now the reasons why uncertainty and the institutional cir-
cumstances which surround it may also be valued by the Services.18 The
15 This assumes that thereisno continuing employment commitment for
staff and that severance costs are negligible. These are rough but probably close
approximations.
16 Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process,p. 183.
iT George R. Hall and Robert E. Johnson, A Review of Air Force Procurement,
1962—1 964, RM-4500-PR, The RAND Corporation, May 1965, pp. 83—93.
18 Kaysen observes that the CPFF contract has been used "becauseitis
necessary, not because the Services have desired it. On the contrary, both the
tradition and the statutory framework of government procurement within whichDefense Contracts: Incentives & Performance 227
principal reason why task uncertainty is likely to be valued by the
Services is the ready defensibility that it provides. Task uncertainty frees
not only the contractor but also the Services from critical efficiency re-
views. Unable to ascertain efficiency performance in any fundamental
sense, congressional attention is shifted to an examination of profits and
conspicuous-expenditure items. But CPFF assures that no windfall profits
will be realized and hence criticism from this quarter is also forestalled.
Assuming that tight controls are exercised over salaries, advertising,
travel, entertainment, and so forth (and the evidence suggests that these
are in fact closely scrutinized) ,19 the Services together with their contract-
negotiating and administrating officials are unlikely to be found vul-
nerable.
Since, as Enthoven and Rowan have pungently observed "the Services
are concerned primarily with the defense of the United States and not
with saving the taxpayers' money," 20 the Services may not only feel
secure in approving costs of a technical nature (both operating and
"investment" types) which, given task uncertainty, require expertise to
evaluate, but they may actively support such expenditures. Put some-
what differently, there is a natural tendency in most organizations to
regard the opportunity cost of money in other uses as rather low; and
the development of a broad capability by each contractor enhances,
from the Services' point of view, the defense posture of the country.
A final if indirect reason why the Services may value (or at least
accept) uncertainty, arises from the positive relationship between pro-
gram size and uncertainty. Large programs tend to be both more un-
certain and more "glamorous" (for example, the "man on the moon
program"), and because of this glamour it may be easier to obtain public
support for them. Moreover, they secure a commitment which, while
subject to stretch-out or modification, is infrequently canceled outright.2'
the Services operate emphasize competitive bidding on a fixed price basis" ("Im-
proving the Efficiency of Military Research," p. 243). Surely Kaysen is correct
in diagnosing the need for the change and the natural reluctance of the Services
to make the shift. But one should guard against concluding that once the shift
was made that the Services found the CPFF arrangement undesirable and that
a preference for fixed price contracts remains. Learning to live with CPFF may
not have been so painful after all.
19 Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process, p. 205.
20 Alain Enthoven and Harry S. Rowen, "Defense Planning and Organization,"
in Public Finances: Needs, Sources, and Utilization, ed. by James M. Buchanan,
Princeton, N.J., 1961, p. 381.
21 Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition System, pp. 320—321.228 Institutional Structures and Defense Spending
For these reasons, as well as for the reasons of providing defensibility
and enhancing capability, uncertainty has practical advantages for the
Services. Since both contracting parties benefit from it,itis scarcely
surprising that efforts to reduce uncertainty by partitioning the task
rather than following a unified-systems-approach have not been favored.
ill. Incentive Fee Contracts
To the extent that cost uncertainty has net advantages from the point
of view of both the contractor and the Service negotiators, it is only
reasonable to assume that both display some preference for it. Earlier
treatments of defense contracting have ignored these advantages and
thus, in my view, have provided incomplete explanations for the over-
run conditions observed in the weapons acquisition process. Likewise,
the failure to distinguish between operating and investment expendi-
tures has frequently obscured the analysis of overrun tendencies. Never-
theless, it has long been recognized that overruns have been excessive
and that incentives for cost control have been weak under the CPFF
form of contracting. As a remedy for this condition, incentive-fee con-
tracts have been employed. These contracts permit the contractor to
retain some of the cost savings when an underrun is experienced and
require him to bear part of the cost burden when target costs are over-
run. Incentive payments are also occasionally tied to technical per-
formance and delivery time, but I will focus on the cost-incentive prob-
lem.
The Defense Department has recently attempted to shift away from
CPFF contracts to those with profit-incentive features. Between 1961
and 1965, CPFF contracts as a percentage of total contract awards were
reduced from 38 per cent to 9.5 per cent. The Secretary of Defense re-
ports that, "At a minimum, our analyses indicate that 10 cents is saved
for each dollar shifted from CPFF to other forms of contracts." 22Among
22Memorandumfrom the Secretary of Defense to the President, Department
of Defense Cost Reduction Program—Second Annual Progress Report, July 7,
1964, p. 8. The estimated 10 per cent savings is incredibly stable. In fiscal 1963,
$4.3 billion in contracts were converted from CPFF with estimated savings of
$ .436 billion. In 1964 the corresponding figures were $6.2 billion and $ .616
billion, while for 1965 they were $6.6 billion and $ .658 billion. Department of
Defense Cost Reduction Program—Third Annual Progress Report, July 14, 1965,
p. 39.Defense Contracts: Incentives & Performance 229
the factors that are said to be responsible for these savings are: (1)
more detailed precontract planning, (2) fewer and smaller cost over-
runs, and (3) improved weapon system performance. Unfortunately the
detailed basis for the estimated savings of 10 cents per dollar shifted out
of the CPFF form is not provided. Lacking such support these claims
appear to be highly conjectural and, for reasons that I will develop
shortly, may be entirely specious.
The fact that there are subtle problems in interpreting the effects of
incentive contracts has been widely recognized—by the Department of
Defense,23 as well as by numerous economists who have been concerned
with the weapons acquisition process. The present analysis reaffirms this
view. Indeed, I conclude that the behavioral assumptions required in
order to establish, a priori, the direction of the effect of profit incen-
tives on cost performance are quite implausible, and a very sophisticated
statistical analysis would be required to determine the magnitude of the
effect.
1. BARGAINING BEHAVIOR
The principal difficulty in evaluating the effect of incentive contracts
on cost performance rests on the negotiation of target costs. If negotiated
target costs are identical under both types of contract, and if the technical
characteristics of the tasks to be performed are similar, the observation
that target costs tend to be overrun using CPFF contracts but underrun
when a positive sharing rate is employed clearly suggests that costs are
more carefully controlled by the firm under profit-incentive contracts.
But the assumption that estimated target costs are unchanged is very
much open to question.
It is generally accepted that the contractor is inclined to underestimate
full costs when CPFF contracts are used, in order to improve his pros-
pects for winning the contract. And the Services may, at least tacitly,
encourage such underestimation to gain budgetary support for the pro-
gram, while later agreeing to additional fees on overrun costs.24 A sub-
stantial identity of interest between the contracting parties exists in these
circumstances. When contracts are shifted to an incentive-fee basis, how-
23 Department of Defense, Incentive Contracting Guide, 1963, especially pp.
5—23 and 5 2—54.
24 Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process, pp. 27, 131, 157.230 institutional Structures and Defense Spending
ever, a penalty for overruns is operative. Here, I would expect that
either the attitude of the contractor toward the bargain would harden
or that a tacit understanding that task uncertainty will be resolved in the
contractor's favor through change orders and contract amendments
would exist (or both). Let us examine the shift in bargaining posture
first.
Although an underestimation bias exists when CPFF contracts are in
force, an overestimation bias may operate when incentive-fee contracts
are used; for the greater the differential between negotiated target costs
and true expected costs, the larger the potential profit return to the con-
tractor. Thus, if we let ir be expected profit, ?TT be negotiated target fee,25
CT be negotiated target cost, C be expected cost, andbe the sharing
rate, we have 7T= lrT +a(CT —C).Under CPFF contracts, a is zero
and hence the last term vanishes. When a positive sharing rate is se-
lected, however, the cost difference between negotiated and expected
cost necessarily affects profits; and to assume that bargaining behavior
is unaffected by this change in circumstances is unwarranted.
It is possible, of course, that any toughening of the attitude on the
part of the contractor would be offset by a corresponding toughening in
the attitude of the bargaining agent for the government. Indeed, it has
been argued that the government, as almost the sole purchaser, has an
enormous advantage in its dealings with defense contractors. Moore
observes, however, that the government has been either unable or un-
willing to realize this monopsonistic bargaining advantage, and suggests
that one reason is that it "lacks the skills and resources to make the
necessary technical and cost evaluations of contractors' proposals, but
instead must rely on information supplied by the firm." 26Althoughit is
unquestionably true that the government suffers from an information
disadvantage, this is normally the case for the buyer in most buyer-seller
relationships. Why should the government be decisively less skillful in its
representation for this reason? Indeed, it could be asked, Why should
an information disadvantage prove to be a bargaining disadvantage at
all? As Schelling has argued (and experimental evidence does not con-
trovert, the bargainer with complete information isapt to take a
25Inpractice, negotiated target profit is an increasing function of the sharing
rate, a.
26FrederickT. Moore, Military Procurement and Contracting: An Economic
Analysis, The RAND Corporation, RM-2948-PR, June 1962, p. 54.Defense Contracts: Incentives & Performance 231
more"reasonable" position than his counterpart whose incomplete infor-
mation inclines him to bargain "tough." 27
Amongthe conditions frequently cited as evidence of the bargaining
disadvantage of the Services are scarcity of eligible contractors, im-
portance of maintaining each source of supply, nonstandard character
of the product, smallness of lot sizes, and so on; but parallels could
probably be found among firms bargaining among themselves in the
private sector—and the information disadvantage of the customer does
not appear to have such overriding consequences.28 Thus there must be
special disadvantages that the government's bargaining agents experience
in negotiating contracts with the private sector. Political considerations
aside, I would suggest that there are two: asymmetry in rewards, and
disparity of status between bargainers.
Consider first the asymmetry of rewards. I take the objective of the
Service negotiator to be the "responsible" placement of contracts—by
which I mean placement of contracts with organizations that have the
competence to successfully complete the task and under terms that pro-
tect against gouging. The objective of the contractor's negotiator is to
secure contracts which provide opportunities for discretion while simul-
taneously promising an adequate rate of return and protection against
devastating losses. As indicated above, the joint interests of both parties
under a CPFF contract lead frequently to an underestimation bias. The
Services prefer such a result if it is easier to secure budgetary support
when program costs are underestimated, and cost underestimation pro-
vides them with greater discretionary control over the execution of the
27T.C. Schelling, "Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War," Journal
of Conflict Resolution, 1957, pp. 19—36. In experimental sessions, differences in
bargaining outcomes have been obtained in the direction predicted by Schelling,
but not significantly so (see Sidney Siegel and L. E. Fouraker, Bargaining and
Group Decision Making, New York, 1960). Although the experimental bargaining
situations that they investigated do not obviously generalize to the circumstances
that we are concerned with, neither should we want to dismiss out of hand the
possibility that incomplete information may have advantages. Probably the most
important difference to be noted between the Siegel-Fouraker experiments and
defense contract bargaining is that the bargainer with full information in the
experiments was unable to communicate the details of his knowledge to the
other party, whereas this is not the case for defense contracting. An interesting
bargaining experiment is obviously suggested: How is the bargaining outcome
affected when communication between parties is unrestricted and one party has
complete while the other only partial information?
28Thisis not to say that such parallels are common, but only that they exist
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contract. (This latter point has, so far as I can determine, gone unde-
tected in previous studies of defense contracting. It may, however, be a
principal factor in explaining underestimation bias, and it introduces a
certain subtle kind of rationality into such behavior. From the standpoint
of control, an underestimation bias may well be desirable.) The con-
tractor is apt to yield to these preferences, particularly if plant idleness
is threatened otherwise and the prospects for securing amendments
which recover the normal rate of return on overruns are favorable.
Given an incentive-fee contract, however, the contractor's position
becomes much more vulnerable, and this is evident to both parties to the
bargain. Despite the fact that implicit "understandings" that cost over-
runs will be covered by contract amendments may exist, these are quite
unenforceable and given the caprices of politics, the contractor is un-
willing to accept the same low target cost figure that he would with a
CPFF contract. By mutual consent, therefore, an increase in target costs
over the CPFF figure naturally results when incentive fees are intro-
duced. If indeed this description of bargaining behavior is at all repre-
sentative of true preferences and attitudes in defense contracting, clearly
the notion of "arms-length" bargaining is quite inappropriate to an un-
derstanding of this phenomenon.
Status differentials may also influence the outcome of the negotia-
tiOnS.29 Thus, I would suggest that where such differentials exist, the low-
status bargainer tends to defer to the high-status bargainer and is in-
clined to adopt a less vigorous bargaining posture. Exceptions are pos-
sible of course, but on the average I would expect such attitudes to
prevail. In the present circumstances it would appear that inferior status
is generally imputed to the civil servant relative to his counterpart in
private industry. Moreover, for the civil servant, taking a tough bargain-
ing posture may well expose him to contempt rather than enhance his
professional recognition. The structural advantage (monopsony power)
that the government's bargaining agents possess indeed makes it difficult
for them to adopt a tough bargaining stance. To do so Is to invite the
charge of an arbitrary exercise of power that is attributable neither to ne-
gotiating skills nor superior performance in a prior period, but is merely
the result of structural leverage. As with most professionals, the status of
the Service negotiators depends jointly on the evaluations of their em-
29Kaysen,"Improving the Efficiency of Military Research," p. 261.Defense Contracts: Incentives & Performance 233
ployer and of the profession with which they identify. If the Service's
rewards for tough bargaining are weak, a tendency to make concessions
in order to obtain professional favor seems likely. A more conciliatory
bargaining stance may seem an appropriate way to secure such favor.30
Thus, I suggest that the importance of imperfect knowledge of the
character (and hence cost) of the product is not so much that imperfect
knowledge leaves the government's negotiators at a bargaining disadvan-
tage, but that it permits nonobjective considerations to influence bar-
gaining behavior. Where knowledge of the product and costs is com-
plete, the appropriate target cost is fully specified. Where this is not true,
however, a range of outcomes is possible so that the individual and
collective objectives of the parties and the differences in bargaining
posture can affect the negotiations. When CPFF contracts are used, the
joint preferences of the parties tend to bias the negotiated target cost
downward. However, an adjustment upward can be expected to occur
when strong profit-incentive features are employed. Such upward ad-
justments may be quite desirable from the viewpoint of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, as long at least as realized costs do not in-
crease significantly as a result (a possibility which my analysis makes
clear but which the OSD appears to ignore). It provides the OSD with
somewhat better planning data and tends to weaken the interest iden-
tities between the Services and their contractors.31
2. THE SHARING RATE AND INVESTMENT EXPENSE
I consider now the effects of increasing the sharing rate on "invest-
ment" expenses. Assuming that the firm is operated as a profit-maxi-
mizer, an increase in negotiated target costs encourages additional ex-
penditures on investment expense while an increase in the sharing rate
makes it less attractive to incur current-period expenses that yield future-
Thesepropositions would appear to be testable in laboratory bargaining in-
vestigations. In support of this general position we note Scherer's observation that,
"Service officials deliberately refrained from pressing for development cost re-
ductions because they wanted to maintain amicable contractor relations, anticipa-
tion that a friendly contractor would turn in a quicker and better development
job." The Weapons Acquisition Process, p.33.I would suggest that amicable
relations are valued by the contracting officers and technical personnel of the
Services whether or not they lead to these performance results. Indeed, if there is a
correlation between attitude of the Services and performance results, I would
predict it is the opposite of that suggested above.
31Jam indebted to M. J. Peck for calling my attention to this possibility.234 Institutional Structures and Defense Spending
period benefits. But an increased sharing rate designed to discourage
expenditures on internal technical and administrative expenses may be
partly (or even wholly) offset by an increase in the target cost, as dis-
cussed above.
These relations can be investigated somewhat more formally with
the following model. Designating the participation rate (or "sharing"
rate) in overruns and underruns as a, the negotiated target profit as
ITT, the negotiated target cost as CT, and actual cost as CA, actual profit
is given by
7rT+0!(CT —CA), (1)
where all the terms refer to current-period results. My objective is to
elaborate the model and extend it to include multiperiod effects.
First we look at the components of current-period cost. These are
of two types: current-period operating costs, C1, that are mainly of
a direct-cost nature, and current-period "investments" in staff expendi-
tures, S1, that both contribute to current performance and provide the
firm with a future-period capability and tend to be of an indirect-cost
nature. Neglecting overrun penalties (reputation effects), these latter ex-
penditures improve the contractor's eligibility for future-period awards.
Target profit can be broken down into target revenue less target cost.
Letting pbethe target rate of return over target cost, and assuming that
2<0 2)
we have target revenue given by
RT =[1+ p(a)]Cr. (3)
Actual revenue is given by
RA =RT+ (1 —a)(CA —CT) (4)
so that expected actual current period profits, as given by (1), can be
expressed as
7rA =RA—CA=p(a)CT+ a(CT —C1—S1). (1')
The analysis can be shifted into a two-period context (the generaliza-
tion to a multiperiod analysis being a simple extension of the two-period
model) by letting R2, C2, and S2 be revenue, direct cost, and staff ex-
penditure respectively in period 2 and by denoting the discount factor byDefense Contracts: Incentives & Performance 235
V, where V =1/(1+ r) and r is the discount rate. Since future-period
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where Z1 is the excess of cost over the allowable overrun in period 1 and
is defined as
Z1 =C1+ S1 —(1+ 7)CT
whereis the overrun allowance.82
The objective of the firm is assumed to be the maximization of dis-
counted profits subject to the constraint that the "yield" of C1 and S1,
given by f(C1, S1), where Sf/SC1 > 0, Sf/5S1 > 0, satisfies the per-
formance specifications Formulatingthe problem as a Lagrangian
we have:
max L(C1, S1, X) =p(a)CT+ a(CT —C1—S1) (6)
+ (R2 —C2—S2)V+ X[f(C1, S1) —Pi1
From the first order condition for a maximum we obtain the following







Thisis shown graphically in Figure 1.
The system is constrained to operate along P1. Current costs will be
minimized by operating at the point where the 45 degree line is tangent
to the locus P,namelyat E. Since the absolute value of the numerator
exceeds that of the denominator in equation (7), however, the firm will
operate at a position on the locus above E. It will, in other words, favor
staff expense due to the capability advantage this furnishes in period 2.
32Iassume that R2 is separable, so that 82R2/8S1oZ1 =0,and that isan




Differentiating (7) with respect to a,andassuming that CT is tin-
changed, yields a decrease in the marginal rate of technical-substitution
expression, implying that operating costs will be substituted for staff
expense as aisincreased (say fromtoinFigure 1). Put differently,
low values of ainducerelatively large expenditures on those costs that
most contribute to future-period capability (S1), and as aisincreased,
these staff expenditures are progressively reduced.
Replacing the assumption thatis unchanged by one in which CT
increases as aincreasesprevents us from assigning these directional
effects unambiguously. This derives from the fact that increasing
suppresses the reputation effect. That is, differentiating (7) with respect
to awith > 0 leaves the sign of the change in the marginal
rate of technical substitution uncertain and the response of S1 to a
cannotbe determined on purely qualitative grounds.
Differentiating (7) with respect to however, yields unambiguous
•directional-response adjustments. Here the marginal rate of technical
substitution is increased in response to an increase in CT, implying
















costs are negotiated. In some superficial sense it would appear that more
dependable results can be secured through target-cost control than by
manipulating the sharing rate, and this implication is reinforced by the
fact that the same types of qualitative properties are obtained from a
utility-maximization model in which profits, staff, and operating slack
(on-the-job leisure)principal components.33 Thus we might be led to
conclude that although manipulating the sharing rate may lead to tighter
expense control, this is by no means inevitable, and thus reducing the
target cost is the preferred technique for securing expense control.
Several qualifications are necessary before uncritical acceptance of
this line of argument is warranted. First, within the context of the
profit-maximizing model, reducing CT leads to reductions in S1 only to
the extent that the "reputation" effect can be meaningfully enforced.
As I have pointed out above, this is difficult where task uncertainty is
great. In the utility-maximizing model, reducingshrinks profits di-
rectly, andthusinduces tighter expense control whatever the reputation
effects, but in practice this is effective only if subsequent contract amend-
380.E. Williamson, DefenseContracts:An Analysis of Adaptive Response,
The RAND Corporation, RM-4363-PR, June 1965, pp. 21—29, 56—62.238 Institutional Structures and Defense Spending
ments are not permitted to swamp the initial agreement. Again this latter
is a serious threat whenever task uncertainty is great. Second, CT can be
reduced only by mutual agreement of both parties to the contract, and
presumably there comes a point below which the marginal reduction
in CT does not justify the bargaining costs. Third, the possibility of
using the sharing rate in conjunction with the target cost should be
considered. If the contractor possesses a trade-off surface between CT
and a such as that shown in Figure 2, the government negotiator would
ideally view his task as choosing that pair of a and CT values on the
indifference locus T so as to induce least-cost performance (selection
of S1 and C1 values close to E on P1 in Figure 1)of the contract.
As drawn, the indifference locus T is discontinuous at a =0.This
implies that the shift in a contract from a zero sharing rate (CPFF)
to incentive-fee status produces a difference not merely in degree but
in kind. A continuing interdependency relation supported by implicit
"understandings" notwithstanding, the circumstances surrounding an
incentive-fee contract, even at a low sharing rate, are sufficiently differ-
ent from the atmosphere that prevails under CPFF that a discontinuity
at a =0appears. Both the shift in bargaining postures (as described
above) and in contract-execution relations are responsible for this result.
As with a marriage contract, to use a somewhat imperfect analogy, only
a "little bit" of infidelity is enough to undermine the relationship.
Both the magnitude of the discontinuity at a =0and the shape of
the 7 curve in the positive sharing-rate region are affected by the degree
of contract uncertainty. More precisely, the gap increases and the slope
of the indifference curve increases as uncertainty becomes greater, since
positive sharing rates are more risky in these circumstances. This is of
particular relevance when the properties of the isocost curves are
allowed for.
The family of curves shown as represent isocost curves and
derive from the assumptions, implicit in the model described in equa-
tions (1)—(7), that
TC =g(CT,a); > 0,<0 (8)
<0,ga2<0
This neglects effects of changing andon target profit. This simplifies
the analysis and does not effect the results in any significant way.Defense Contracts. Incentives & Performance 239
The isocost curves necessarily have the property that d(TC) =0,so







whence the shape of the family of isocost curves shown in Figure 2
follows directly. As drawn, the lowest attainable total cost is given
by the curve that passes through a= 0,the corresponding target cost
being CT°. If, however, a positive sharing rate is required by the Secre-
tary of Defense, TC1 is the lowest cost that can be realized, the optimum
sharing rate and target cost being andCT1 respectively. The large
increase in CT1 over CTO should be noted.
As the size of the discontinuity in 7ata0decreases and as the
slope of 7decreases,both of which will occur as contract uncertainty
is reduced, CPFF becomes progressively less advantageous and indeed
eventually becomes suboptimal. Putdifferently,least-cost tangency
between the isocost curves and the indifference locus at a positive
sharing rate becomes more likely as uncertainty is reduced. Since the
resulting tangency would occur on a lower isocost curve than that
which passes through a= 0,expected total costs would decrease. If,
simultaneously, reducing uncertainty shifts the family of isocost curves
upward, this result is all the more likely. This is not to suggest that
lower costs are automatic; this also requires intelligent bargaining be-
havior. But since reducing uncertainty also limits the range of de-
fensible bargaining postures, such a result seems probable. That the
model has the property that positive sharing rates become desirable
when uncertainty is relatively low is a condition which has long been
intuitively plausible, but has hitherto lacked analytic content.
The relevance of this analysis for optimum institutional arrangements
might also be indicated. If tasks are frequently defined in such a way
that uncertainty remains large so that a= 0is the preferred contractual
arrangement, yet CPFF is known to possess inherent expense control
deficiencies, should the government circumvent this condition by per-
forming more of its own research in-house? Although this possibility
deserves serious consideration, it takes us beyond the scope of the pres-240 institutional Structures and Defense Spending
ent investigation. I suspect, however, that it is not politically feasible,
and that it involves expense control difficulties of its own. Rather, the
task-partitioning approach described in the following section seems more
attractive instead.
In a related vein, ifcx= 0is frequently the preferred contractual
arrangement for defense contracting, might this also be true within
the private sector in circumstances where task uncertainty, for whatever
reason, is large? At least occasionally I would expect this to be true, and
in such circumstances an economic justification for vertical merger exists.
But again this raises a variety of difficult issues that take us beyond the
scope of the present paper. My purpose here is merely to point out the
relevance of the present analysis for the study of contractual relations
outside of the defense-contracting area.
Finally, the question of appropriate contractual objectives deserves
mention. It might be argued that least-cost performance imputes too
limited a purpose to the government negotiator, and that concern for
future-period capability should also be his legitimate concern. In my
view, however, capability can be achieved by directly supporting those
programs which provide it, and the introduction of considerations of
this sort into every contract unnecessarily confuses objectives and leads
to precisely that type of loss in reputation effect that we have been
attempting to avoid. I therefore propose that the appropriate goal in
every contract should be the least-cost performance of a reasonably
narrow set of objectives. Where hardware is needed, obscure future-
period capability considerations should therefore not be permitted to
displace the least-cost achievement of this end. If instead future-period
capability is the principal objective, research that is explicitly directed
to this purpose should be supported and ongoing or projected hardware
programs should not be made to bear expenditures of this sort. Put
differently, insistence on global rather than local contracting goals leads
to a diffusion of purpose and consequent loss of control that is sub-
optimal.
IV. A Possible Alternative Approach
The principal implications of the foregoing analysis are that (1) the
sharing rate cannot be arbitrarily set without regard for target-cost
adjustments, and (2) the most dependable way of securing expense con-Defense Contracts: incentives & Performance 241
trol may be to arrange the task so as to permit binding reputation-
effect evaluations. Only when reputation effects are made binding does
the negotiation of CT have genuine significance, and only when CT is
chosen meaningfully does the selection of "optimal" values of a have
real cost control importance. In some respects my analysis thus supports
the Hitch and McKean proposition that "the real opportunity for savings
and strengthening incentives may lie in improving the procedure for the
setting of cost targets."Similarly Dupré observes that "the most im-
portant initial step that can be taken to improve efficiency in weapons
procurement is undoubtedly to strengthen the government's ability to
evaluate technical proposals, negotiate contracts, and supervise perfor-
mance." 36Butcorrect as this may be, such advice is futile unless it is
accompanied by a set of operational procedures by which the indicated
improvement can be secured. The fundamental change required in order
to realize these objectives is to shrink the range of discretion by reducing
task uncertainty. So long as task uncertainty is great, neither contract
negotiations nor followup surveillance and subsequent awards can be
used effectively to achieve efficient contract performance. Ex ante esti-
mates cannot be regarded as meaningful targets, and thus ex post
evaluations can scarcely be performed with confidence. Consider the
effect on negotiations first.
Where knowledge of costs is imperfect and the cost variance is large,
a wide range of negotiated target costs can be represented defensibly.
Thus the joint preferences of the negotiators can be expected to in-
fluence systematically the target-cost outcome. Where knowledge is more
complete, however, objective considerations override bargaining atti-
and the opportunity to bias the outcome is correspondingly cir-
cumscribed.
In addition, with cost uncertainties substantially removed, contract
performance comes in for closer scrutiny. Discretionary expense items
are more difficult to justify. Moreover, such overruns as may occur
under these circumstances can be more easily attributed to contractor
Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the
Nuclear Age, The RAND Corporation, R-346, March 1960, p. 232.
36Stefan Dupré, "The Efficiency of Military Research and Development:
Kaysen, Cherington and the Budget Bureau," in Friedrich and Harris,eds.,
Public Policy 1963, p. 298.
87Siegeland Fouraker found in experimental sessions that increased knowledge
reduced the range of bargaining (Bargaining and Group Decision Making, p. 87).242 Institutional Structures and Defense Spending
performance rather than chance, so that cost-performance reputation
effects can be made binding and future contract awards can be made
more contingent on present-period performance. Thus there is an in-
ducement to exercise cost control, not merely for its effect on current
profits, but also for the promise of future awards. While incentive prac-
tices currently in use may fail to discourage expenditures that enhance
the contractor's future capability and current satisfaction, the introduc-
tion into the contractual relationship of a binding reputation effect would
help to attenuate expenditures of these types.
Among the costs that can be reduced if advance knowledge of the
task is more complete are the contract administration costs. Where sub-
stantial task uncertainty exists, the contracting officers responsible for
the direction of the task are apt to demand detailed progress reports
and close, continuing inspection in order to be able to defend the
program and their own actions in relation to it. The demands for "full
information" that arise out of this felt need for defensibility can be re-
duced, however, if uncertainty is reduced prior to the time of the negotia-
tions. If this can be done, the perceived threat of being assigned re-
sponsibility for failure is alleviated, and the incentives to devise elaborate
control devices are correspondingly weakened.58
The manifold advantages of reducing task uncertainty should thus be
clear. The means by which this result can be obtained have yet to be
specified. What follows is an attempt, admittedly tentative and pre-
liminary, to suggest how this might be done. I am nevertheless en-
couraged by the fact that both my study of this problem and Kaysen's
38Existingcontrol systems would not automatically disappear. Their elimina-
tion would require a determined effort from above. But assuming that task
uncertainty can be reduced substantially, the incentives to resort to these control
devices will be weakened, and thus the controls, once eliminated, are unlikely
to recur."Kaysen,"Improving the Efficiency of Military Research," pp. 250—253, 264,
268. My failure to acquaint myself with Kaysen's work until my own was in
advanced stages of completion opens me up to the charge of a tardy literature
search, but I would emphasize a somewhat different aspect. In an area where
investigations almost necessarily have a certain conjectural quality, two inde-
pendent studies reached very similar conclusions with respect to the advantages
of task-partitioning. Kaysen isalso concerned with the broader problem of
what is the preferred institutional arrangement for doing R and D and suggests
that the nonprofit research institute or the government laboratory be used in
place of the ordinary business enterprise (Ibid., pp. 265—66). Although he makes
a plausible case for this, I find it too much at variance with prevailing norms to
be politically possible, and since it is not vital to the success of the task decom-Defense Contracts: Incentives & Performance 243
came to approximately the same type of recommendations (albeit via
different routes)—namely that a sequential approach to weapons pro-
curement promises much better efficiency (and possibly stability) 4°per-
formance than obtains under the "systems approach" used presently.
My principal proposal is to use task-partitioning as a device for
reducing the conditional uncertainty that exists between system com-
ponents. Thus suppose that a new weapons system is under considera-
tion and that the task is technically separable into two parts, A and B.
Assume also that either (1) work on B logically follows at least the
exploratory work on A or (2) although A and B must be made com-
patible at an assembly stage, work on each component can proceed
independently of that on the other (or at most only loose, contemporane-
ous coordination is necessary to assure gross compatibility in the de-
signs). In schematic form, the task can be represented as one of the
following two types (where therefer to outcomes and I to an inte-
grated combination of subsystems) shown in Figure 3.
Consider first the sequential type of task. If the task is contracted for
as a unit, the full range of outcomes shown by 012,013and 014
must be allowed for at the outset. This high degree of variability makes
it difficult to specify target costs objectively and this likewise applies to
contract administration. Hence, reputation effects can scarcely be as-
signed with confidence at the termination of the contract. If, however,
the stage 1 and stage 2 problems are contracted for separately, and
assuming that the distribution of outcomes under 012 differs in a
nontrivial way from that of 021, 022,eachpart of the task will possess
a lower degree of variability than does the whole. Thus if the stage 1
investigation yields 01, the 021 and 022 outcomes can be dismissed alto-
gether in contracting for the stage 2 part of the task. By shrinking the
range of defensible outcomes in this way, the negotiation, execution,
and postcontract evaluation can all be performed with more confidence.
Both more accurate target-costing and tighter expense control could
be expected.
If instead the task tends to be of the contemporaneous variety shown
in Figure 3, the advantages of task-partitioning result from sharper ac-
countability and avoidance of those diseconomies of control inherent in
position approach, I emphasize instead the ways by which existing institutional
arrangements can be made to work better.
Kaysendoes not explicitly concern himself with the stability objective.244 InstitutionalStructures and Defense Spending








large program size. Accountability is made difficult when both aspects
of the task are treated as a unit since an effective ex post evaluation
requires unscrambling the parts, and this may be virtually impossible.
The diseconomies of control that result from large size are due to what
I have referred to elsewhere as "control loss," which is an increasing
function of the number of hierarchical levels involved in the administra-
tion of a task,41 and where component work is combined rather than
contracted for separately, a centralized form of organization for both
operations and control may appear "natural." 42 But this requires addi-
tional hierarchical levels in the administrative structure, which leads to
41 My argument is a formalization of the descriptive treatments of this problem
by E. A. G. Robinson, R. H. Coase, and more recently by Gordon Tullock and
Anthony Downs. The details of the formal model and references to the above
literature are given in "Hierarchical Control, Optimum Firm Size, and Regulatory
Behavior," unpublished manuscript, November 1965.
42 Although I regard itas the likely way in which to organize,itis not
inevitable. Thus it would be possible to contract for the entire system but to
organize subgroups to perform each part of the task separately. There isa
common tendency, however, for hierarchical organizations to exaggerate the
benefits of planning, coordination, and integration, and this leads to a preference
for centralized over decentralized forms of operation. Put somewhat differently,
"alllargeorganizations[tenditooverestimatethecostsofflexibilityand
underestimate its benefits." Burton H. Klein, "Policy Issues in the Conduct of
Military Development Programs," in Economics 01 Research and Development,
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greater control loss and thus lower efficiency than that which would
result from decentralized management of each of the technically separ-
able components.
It is of course relevant to ask the relative frequency with which tasks
tend to be of the sequential rather than the contemporaneous types, since
the arguments for partitioning are probably more compelling for the
former. Kaysen observes in this connection that: 48
Characteristically,the problems to be solved contain a large empirical
element, in the sense of questions which can be answered only by experiment
and observation, not by analysis and calculation alone. In any but trivially
simple cases, the research and development task is sequential; and some
questions cannot be answered and indeed, frequently cannot even be asked
before other antecedent questions have been answered.
In addition to the direct advantages of task decomposition sketched
above, this approach has the additional advantage that it complements
two other recent proposals for restructuring the approach to R and
D: the Klein-Meckling-Nelson "proposalfor parallel R and D, and the
Enthoven-Rowenproposal concerning the mix of capabilities required.
Klein and Meckling argue that the comprehensive, system-planning
approach to development decisions is inappropriate for many or even
most developments. They hold that the problem is not "one of choosing
among specific end-product alternatives, but rather a problem of choos-
ing a course of action initially consistent with a wide range of such
alternatives; and of narrowing the choice as development proceeds."
Theytherefore approach the R-and-D problem as a sequential de-
cision problem in which parallel R and D is conducted on components
rather than systems. The potential cost savings inherent in this ap-
proach (at least under certain ideal circumstances) have been analyzed
by Nelson, and the project histories reviewed by Marschak suggest that
such savings could be realized.47
Kaysen,"Improving the Efficiency of Military Research," p. 250.
Burton Klein and William Meckling, Application of Operations Research
to Development Decisions, Santa Monica, 1958, and R. R. Nelson, "Uncertainty,
Learning, and the Economics of Parallel Research and Development Efforts,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, November 1961, pp. 351—364.
Enthoven and Rowen, "Defense Planning and Organization."
46Kleinand Meckling, Application of Operations Research, p. 352; emphasis
added.
Nelson, "Uncertainty, Learning, and the Economics of Parallel Research,"
and T. A. Marschak, The Role of Project Histories in the Study of R&D, The
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The argument of Enthoven and Rowen is that a broad spectrum of
capabilities is needed and that "research and development policy should
aim at preventing the creation of a few, large-scale programs, which
large and powerful interests will want to preserve, before the major un-
certainties have been resolved." Instead, we should encourage "com-
petition, duplication, and overlap...[as]the price we pay for the
reduction of uncertainty." 48Thustechnically (parallel R and D), stra-
tegically (preserving options), and contractually (my argument), task
decomposition appears to be superior to the systems approach.
It is perhaps also relevant to observe that, although the data are in-
complete and the details are not entirely clear, task-partitioning has
been practiced successfully in French aircraft development. To the extent
that crude comparisons are meaningful, the cost of these programs rela-
tive to American experience appears to be substantially lower and
development time has also been reduced. No doubt there are a number
of factors that are responsible for these differences. If my arguments for
partitioning are correct, however, task-partitioning would at least ap-
pear to be a contributing factor and may explain a significant fraction
of these performance differences.
Such a partitioning can lead to further benefits if, as a result of the
reduction in the average size of the contract, an increased number
of firms can qualify for consideration when contracts are awarded.
Where entire systems are contracted for as a package, only a few large
defense contractors can fulfill prime-contractor qualifications. Thus,
competition for these awards, limited to a handful, may be less eftective
than it might otherwise be, and confidence in the verity of the negotia-
tions will be impaired. By opening up the bidding to a larger number
of firms, task-partitioning may well lead to a more objective determina-
tion of costs even if uncertainty remains substantial.4°
Finally, task decomposition has the additional advantage that it may
help to avoid "boom and bust" in the sales and employment of de-
fense contractors. The cyclical adjustment in the volume of operations
associated with a large system as it goes through the phases of initia-
tion, rapid growth, peaking, and tailing-off, would be less marked if the
48Enthovenand Rowen, "Defense Planning and Organization," pp. 369 and
372.
For a similar view, see Kaysen, "Improving the Efficiency of Military Re-
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task were partitioned. Instead of a few large programs absorbing the
bulk of a firm's (or the industry's) capacity, a number of smaller pro-
grams could be in progress simultaneously. Assuming that they were
initiated at different times, the result would be a stabilization in em-
ployment and sales.
If task-partitioning of this sort is feasible and the merits I claim for it
are valid, the question arises as to why partitioning has not been done
already. Three answers can be supplied. One (and the one which I
believe has been neglected) is that task uncertainty has been valued for
the discretionary opportunities that it affords—both to the Services
and to the contractor. They have therefore been disinclined to restruc-
ture the task along the lines suggested-. In a somewhat similar vein, there
is the administrative preference of both contractors and the Services
for centralized-planning approaches to complex problems. Finally, and
most critical to the argument advanced here, the suggested approach has
certain costs, and these may be too great to justify the change.
Four possible disadvantages (costs) of task-partitioning deserve our
attention. First, task-partitioning may lead to serious subsystem-to-sub-
system interfacial problems. Second, the administrative costs of contract
proliferation may be substantial. Third, the partitioning may lead to
certain diseconomies of small scale. Finally, time may be of the essence
and decentralized operations may lead to excessive time delays.
The interfacial problems may appear to be insuperable.50 If work on
the components proceeds in semiautonomous fashion, problems of com-
patibility and of "fitting" at component and subsystem interfaces may
well be neglected. Thus any apparent savings realized by splitting up
the task may be more than offset by the costs of achieving component
50Thisappears to be Paul W. Cherington's position. See his "Kaysen on
Military Research and Development: A Comment," in Friedrich and Harris,
eds., Public Policy, 1963, p. 282. A more moderate view of the interfacial
problem is provided by Hitch and McKean: "An important reason for early,
fairly detailed specification of weapon systems is the need to match the various
components under development.... Thisneed is real and must be achieved at
the appropriate stage. Where a system is being put together from previously
developed and tested components..., matchingand the detailed specifications
required by matching may be imposed without too much risk at the preliminary
design stage. But where a new system is really advanced, where the components
have yet to be developed and tested for feasibility and performance, premature
concern over physical matching can delay development by years. (Italics added).
The urgent thing is usually to get the critical components developed to the
point where they can be tested.... Whenit is known that they work is early
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compatibility later. Moreover, as responsibility for making the necessary
changes might be unclear, administrative costs and delays can be antici-
pated. In my opinion, however, these expenses may be easily exag-
gerated. Thus, the usual procedure in a multicomponent development
program (the contract for which now goes to a single contractor) is for
the contractor to follow a course not unlike that described here, only
without many of the benefits inherent in advance task-partitioning and
sequential R and ID. The component work is likely to be done con-
temporaneously by at least partially decomposing the task and assigning
parts of it to research groups (some in-house, others to subcontractors)
that are responsible for developing a device that meets the principal
specifications (among which, of course, are included some crude com-
patibility requirements). Once this stage has been reached, additional re-
finements are made to secure more perfect matching between successive
"surfaces." However, since all of the work is done under the super-
vision of a prime contractor, the responsibility for performing the inter-
facial work is his, and the task goes on to completion without drawing
special attention to interfacial costs of this sort. Although they may be
disguised, these expenses are nonetheless real. If the need to make inter-
facial corrections is recognized and the funds for this purpose are pro-
vided, task decomposition would merely make these costs at least partly
explicit. Moreover, by recognizing the costs explicitly and providing for
the work separately, the problem of responsibility can be reduced. It
is by no means certain, therefore, that interfacial costs would be sig-
nificantly greater under the proposed task-partitioning approach than
they are under a prime-contractor-system approach.
There is a real possibility that contract administration costs would
proliferate if tasks were partitioned into components and proposals were
split off from development. But the felt need for defensibility tends to
be reduced when uncertainty is reduced, so that the demands for Service
control are apt to be less under the proposed approach. Furthermore,
competition for contract awards is likely to be improved and individual
contract negotiations shortened and made less costly. Although the num-
ber of negotiations and the number of contracts will increase sub-
stantially if the task-partitioning approach is adopted, it is not clear that
over-all contract administration costs would increase.
With regard to the argument that economies of scale may be sacri-
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out that: (1) the reduction in the average contract size in shifting from
the systems to the sequential approach is probably on the order of 10
rather than 100, so that while the individual parts are smaller they still
remain sizeable; (2) if the large firms realize economies of scale they
will presumably secure more of the component work by submitting
lower bids and performing at lower cost than their smaller rivals; (3)
the evidence suggests that "in most industries, the productivity of an
R-and-D program of given scale seems to be lower in the largest firms
than in somewhat smaller firms,"so that on those parts of the task for
which they possess sufficient size to qualify, awarding contracts to smaller
arms may yield cost economies; (4) the task decomposition approach
should help stabilize sales and employment so that diseconomies associ-
ated with large variation here can be reduced; and (5) the problem of
expense control is largely one of incentives and opportunities—to focus
on economies of scale narrowly conceived is to miss entirely the dys-
functional aspects of current performance.
Finally, we have the "time-is-of-the-essence" argument. Here I would
point out that although an occasional program will demand a crash
effort, and that for this purpose a systems approach may be the pre-
ferred procurement strategy,52 it does not follow that the same strategy is
equally appropriate for more routine affairs. Almost by definition, crash
programs subordinate resource-conserving objectives to secure time ad-
vantages. But, clearly, if every task is given crash-program priorities,
and assuming that the defense budget is limited, the eventual effect is
to reduce the number of programs that can be brought to completion.53
The near-term advantage must therefore be weighed against the loss of
long-term capability. Unless, therefore, crash programs are no longer
the exceptions but have become the rule (the time-discount rate is or-
dinarily very high), the time-is-of-the-essence argument must be quali-
fied to apply to a few programs rather than defense procurement
51 Edwin Mansfield,"Industrial Research and Development Expenditures,"
The Journal of Political Economy, August 1964, p. 338.
52 This is a debatable point. If, however, the systems approach possesses an
advantage it is probably in connection with crash program type efforts.
53 This raises a difficult point. If the size of the defense budget is increased
significantl.y when programs are given a crash-priority status, so that budget
augmentation alleviates the need for budget reallocation to favor the so-called
crash efforts, the Services may experience little or no loss of long-term capability
by maintaining a crisis orientation in their appeals to Congress for funds. The
social welfare effects of resorting to such sales appeals are nonetheless real.250 Institutional Structures and Defense Spending
generally. My concern here has been with a continuing defense effort
rather than any particular and I would urge that my remarks be
considered in this spirit.
V. Conclusions
The trend of defense spending is toward R and D rather than procure-
ment. While the sum of spending on research, development, technology,
and engineering by the Department of Defense and the National Advisory
Committee on Aeronautics in 1953 was 11 per cent of total expenditures
for defense development and procurement, this had increased to 37
per cent by Moreover, procurement now tends to be in smaller
quantities than previously. Hence, if expense control is to be realized at
all, it must be realized early. It is no longer sufficient to postpone atten-
tion to the problem and resort to breakout and second-sourcing late in
the procurement stage to achieve efficiency.
Hopefully the analysis given here produces a better understanding of
the potential identities of interest that pervade the Service-defense con-
tractor relationships. The triad of discretion, defensibility, and uncer-
tainty is particularly vital to an understanding of the adaptive responses
that have been devised by these two groups to the problems of defense
contracting. As I view it, the attainment of efficiency requires a shrinkage
in the range of discretion available to the Services and their defense con-
tractors. Lacking this, a wide range of performance results can be made
"defensible," and efficiency objectives are apt to be displaced in favor
of other goals. The incentives of neither the contractors nor the Ser-
vices are such as to make least-cost performance a high priority objec-
tive in these circumstances. These remarks apply whether a CPFF or
incentive-fee form of contracting is employed; so long as the latitude in
The "missile gap" that was anticipated in the late 1950's and early
is one such crisis. Cherington argues that if a sequential approach had been
taken to the Atlas program that completion would have been delayed for three
years ("Kaysen on Military Research," in Public Policy 1963, p. 275). As Dupré
indicates, this estimate is rather dubious ("The Efficiency of Military Research
and Development," in Public Policy 1963, p. 296), but what I would like to
emphasize here is that even if it is correct, it does not justify a systems approach
for programs that lack this crisis atmosphere. In short, the time-cost trade-off
that may have been appropriate in one class of circumstances and led to one
type of development procurement strategy should not be uncritically gen-
eralized to apply to all circumstances.
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administeringthe contract remains large, manipulating the sharing rate
o'V'er the range which is ordinarily used (zero to 30 per cent) 56seems
to me unlikely to change this cost-performance result significantly. This
does not deny that in some superficial sense an improvement may ap-
pear to have occurred (ci. the statement by the Secretary of Defense,
pp. 228 if.). But considering the ways in which the joint preferences of
the two parties favor other than least-cost objectives and given that the
basic structure of the task remains unchanged, naive projections that
fail to allow for the full range of adaptive responses are hardly grounds
for confidence. Manipulating incentives or providing administrative direc-
tion at the contract execution stage may give the appearance of tight
control, but the critiàal dimension is in definition of tasks. Until the
degree of uncertainty that typically prevails under the systems approach
to weapons procurement is reduced so that task specifications can be
made more objectively, these visible manifestations of change remain
generally suspect.57
My proposal for limiting discretionary opportunities involves re-
structuring the problem by partitioning the task into technically separ-
able components. This bears some similarity to a proposal previously
made by Kaysen. But whereas his concern for an optimal research
strategy also leads him to advocate reasonably drastic changes in the
institutional arrangements under which R and D is performed, I propose
somewhat less ambitious change. My concern is with attainable rather
than ideal results, and my analysis of incentives, controls, and associated
performance consequences indicates that simple task redefinition would
appear to yield net benefits within the context of existing institutional
arrangements. And although "true" cost minimization requires that the
target-cost and sharing rate be selected coordinately, task-partitioning
56Ofone hundred and thirty incentive contracts examined by Frederick T.
Moore, the highest contractor sharing proportion was 30 per cent, and only five
contracts had this high a sharing proportion. The median sharing rate was 20 per
cent. Military Procurement and Contracting: An Economic Analysis, The RAND
Corporation, RM-2948-PR, June 1962, p. 46.
Iam less than sanguine over Scherer's proposal that after-the-fact evalua-
tion by an impartial board would improve contractor performance (The Weapons
Acquisition Process, Chapter 12) for precisely this reason. Until the degree of
task objectivity is improved, this adds a "visible" but otherwise ineffectual control
device. If task redefinition can be successfully performed so as to achieve a
greater degree of objectivity, however, review by an impartial board may well
help secure better performance (by ensuring that the Services perform their
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would appear to produce net benefits short of such an arrangement.
Among the advantages that partitioning promises are:
1. It reduces the amount of uncertainty and hence increases objectivity
in contract negotiations, reduces the felt need for defensibility in ad-
ministering contracts, and permits more reliable evaluations which in
turn allow cost-performance reputation effects to be assigned with con-
fidence. Each of these effects should help to prevent excessive contract
costs.
2. It creates a contract environment in which the full potential of
parallel R-and-D approaches (as previously advocated by Klein, Meck-
ling, and Nelson) can be exploited.
3. It complements R-and-D strategies which emphasize the need for
maintaining options by providing support for work on adaptable com-
ponents and flexible capabilities (as argued for by Enthoven and Rowen).
4. It permits greater competition by increasing the number of eligible
contractors.
5. It lends itself to sales and employment stabilization.
Against these advantages must be weighed the costs associated with
(1) possible interfacial problems, (2) contract proliferation expenses,
(3) sacrifice of scale economies, and (4) possible time delays. It is not
obvious, however, that interfacial costs need be significantly greater
under a sequential program than under the systems approach, especially
if advance allowance is made for them in planning a development effort.
Likewise, although contracts will increase in number they will decrease
in complexity—both at the negotiation and administration stages—so
that administrative cost increases for this reason may be kept within
quite acceptable limits. The scale-economies issue appears to be mainly
a bogus one. Thus the principal objection would appear to be the time-
cost trade-off. Although "missile-gap" crises may have required a massive
concentration of funds and a time-favoring strategy for missile develop-
ment in the recent past, it is unclear that the same type of strategy is
appropriate when consideration is shifted to over-all defense posture on
a continuing (noncrisis) basis. In this I support Kaysen's observation
that it is not "the elapsed time between the initiation and completion of
particular new-weapons projects or even the average length of that inter-
val over all successful development projects" that counts.58 Rather, for
58 Kaysen, "improving the Efficiency of Military Research," p. 263(Italics
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any given level of expenditure, the objective is to design a system which
performs efficiently and optimally balances the short-term against the
long-term defense posture. For such a purpose, the research, develop-
ment, and procurement strategy should be treated as a variable rather
than a parameter.
Appendix
CORRECTIONS FOR INDUSTRY EFFECT 1
If total industry sales fluctuate because of variations in demand for
the output of the industry, the variability of sales among the firms in
the industry will clearly be affected. Thus, to examine the sales vari-
ability experience of firms without correcting for an industry effect is
to impute variability to the firms that, in some sense, might be con-
sidered unavoidable. My objective here is to show how, in principle, it
is possible to separate out the industry effect on firm variability. Thus, let
=salesof thefirm in the 1thi industry in period t,
= = salesof thejth industry in period t,
=varianceabout a linear trend of sales in firm I of industry j.
Our hypothesis of a linear trend is given by:
Sift =aig+ (f323)t + (1)
where a random error term decom-
posible into an industry and firm effect as follows:
= ujg + (2)
1
where mean firm sales =—Tt
1
R, =meanindustry sales =—Tt
and = = vkjg) =0.Letting (S15/R5) =
we have
Var (yjjujg + = + (3)
1am indebted to Roy Radner for helpful comments on this part of the
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TABLE A-i
Sales And Employment Variability Adjusted For
Linear Trend, 1954—1963
Sales Rank Standard Deviation
of Firm Among of Residuals as
500 Largest
Industrials




Lockheed 20 8.8 9.5
North American 21 16.3 13.6
Boeing 25 12.2 8.9
General Dynamics 30 20.8 13.6
United Aircraft 33 13.1 5.1
Douglas 75 16.3 11.4
McDonnell 101 20.8 16.9
Hercules 120 30.4 10.2
Grumman 123 13.7 8.6
Republic 155 29.8 11.8
Northrop 162 15.2 10.8
Curtiss Wright 245 18.7 12.6
Total Aerospace Industry 7.5 7.0




DuPont 11 4.5 4.1
Union Carbide 27 5.7 5.0
Dow Chemical 52 2.7 1.8
Olin-Mathieson 67 3.8 5.2
FMC 87 11.3 21.0
Koppers 189 12.8 11.2
Stauffer 222 9.3 10.9
Total Chemical Industry 3.1 1.6














General Electric 4 6.7 8.2
Westinghouse 16 6.8 4.2
Bendix 63 5.4 4.4
Square D 360 8.4 9.3
ITE Circuit Breaker 424 13.3 7.6
Total Electrical
Equipment Industry 3.6 5.2
Steel
U.S. Steel 6 9.5 5.6
Bethlehem 17 10.7 7.4
Republic 46 11.8 9.2
Inland 64 6.8 3.1
Youngstown Sheet & Tube 84 12.4 8.1
Crucible 218 13.4 8.7
Wheeling 238 8.9 7.8
Total Steel Industry 9.1 5.5
Aluminum
Alcoa 51 5.8 6.1
Reynolds 100 5.8 5.0
Kaiser 129 9.2 9.0
Total Aluminum Industry 4.9 n.a.
Sources: Total aircraft industry and weapon space development
and procurement data from Frederick M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisi-
tion Process: Economic Incentives, Boston, Mass., 1964, pp. 57—58.
Firm data on sales and employment from Fortune's 500 Largest
Industrials, 1955 through 1964.
Total industry sales and employment data, except aerospace, from
Moody's Industrials and Monthly Labor Review, respectively.256 Institutional Structures and Defense Spending
Now, since
= =a3++(S13/R,)+ ￿
and since 1, we have
I
R5=a1+ fl,t + U51 + (4)
I
and given our assumptions with respect to the residuals,
=Var(u51 + =q.2+ (5)
We thus obtain N equations of the form shown in equation 3, and one
equation of the form shown in equation 5 to estimate the N variances,
0jj2,andthe industry effect, 0j2. In short, we have N + 1 independent
equations in N + 1 unknowns and can thus obtain corrected estimates of
the amount of sales variability for each firm. Unfortunately, however, the
technique indicated requires that we obtain data on all of the firms in
the industry, and hence is impractical for our limited purposes. A rough
correction can nevertheless be obtained by observing that from (5)
￿ U2
sothat on substituting into (3) we have
—Yij2UR12, (6)
where all terms on the right hand side of the inequality are observable.
Thus (6) provides a tighter upper bound on firm variability than can be
obtained from uncorrected for any industry effect.
COMMENTS
JACK W. CARLSON, Council of Economic Advisers 1
Mr.Bailey's paper, as well as comments from other participants,
highlights the fact that governmental organizations need to experiment
with market mechanisms.
Although the Department of Defense has provided many innovations
(five-year planning, system analysis and programming), the incentives
and flexibility of low-level managers have remained untouched or have
deteriorated. The following situation prevails:
1. Lower-level managers are "charged" with only a small proportion
(20—30 per cent) of the resources they actually consumed. Conse-
1Formerlywith the Departments of the Air Force and Defense.Defense Contracts: Incentives & Performance 257
quently, there is a tendency to overconsume other seemingly free goods
(70—80 per cent).
2. Among the goods given or "charged," lower-level managers are un-
able to substitute one resource for another (e.g., car for truck, contract
for civilian personnel) even if the substituted resource is less expensive.
3. Managers at lower levels are frequently required to budget and
manage by input (appropriations) accounts. Even though the program-
ming concept is being employed for top-level management, it has failed
to permeate lower levels. When the programming budget is used it is
superimposed upon lower-level organizations without first withdrawing
the system of managing by appropriations (inputs) •2Thisleads to
conflicting and at times, perverse incentives.
4. Lower-level managers do not have a satisfactory method for relat-
ing inputs and resources to organizational outputs in a meaningful and
systematic way. The program budget for management purposes is con-
fined to only higher-levels.
Among general efforts to overcome these problems, the Department
of Defense (primarily the Air Force) has initiated a project appropri-
ately entitled Project FIRM. Although the acronym means "Financial
Information for Resource Management," its ultimate value wifi be to
demand that lower-level managers act like managers in business firms.
The financial information system for this project is being developed for
implementation July 1, 1966 at Laughlin AFB, Del Rio, Texas. The
Project will test the feasibility and efficiency of
1. relating inputs to outputs—e.g., various kinds of equipment and
personnel to produce trained pilots (presently the programming system
is operative for only the broadest programs—e.g., General Purpose
Forces)
2. computing marginal costs for resources consumed (transfer prices)
3. allowing resource substitution
4. tying promotion of managers to success in reducing cost for given
levels of performance (or in the cases with variable effectiveness, relative
levels of cost-effectiveness).
If successful, a pyramid of organizational relationships can be built to
2 Resource Management Program of Assistant Secretaryof
(Comptroller) Robert N. Anthony will help to alleviatethis problem com-
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finally merge with the Program Packages used at the highest manage-
ment levels.
Thus, the Department of Defense will act more like a multiplant or
multifirm corporation with several levels of management. Hopefully,
significant efficiencies will be realized.
In any case, experimentation in this direction is worthwhile and ex-
citing for economists concerned with the Defense Department.
EVSEY D. DOMAR, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
My assignment consists of discussing the papers by Bailey and by
Schlesinger. I must confess that I have had trouble with both. First, I
am no expert on defense problems; second, both papers are so gen-
eral that it is difficult to find issues to argue about.
Bailey's paper deals with the use of the market mechanism in the
Defense Department. All well-intentioned economists are in favor of
that. Since economic analysis, like charity, should begin at home, I
have tried, with my ignorance of the Pentagon, to imagine how the
market mechanism might be used in our, or any other, economics de-
partment. As things stand now, if I need a blackboard for my office, I
have to ask our chairman for one. Naturally, he is worried about setting
a precedent for other members. If he has to buy an extra dozen black-
boards, the marginal cost of my request may run into a thousand
dollars. How is he to decide who really needs a blackboard? Would it
not be better to give each of us an annual allowance for office furniture,
supplies, and even for secretarial help, and let each member spend it
as he sees fit?
This looks like a step forward, but some members may buy things
they don't really need, since they derive no enjoyment from unspent
balances. Why not let them pocket such balances? Imagine the improve-
ment in the economic calculus! Imagine the saving of resources!
To be honest, I am becoming a bit uneasy: suppose some of my dis-
tinguished colleagues spend their valuable time typing their own letters,
or don't write letters at all.Still, I am willing to try. But why stop
here? Why not give the department a lump sum of money to be used
(at the discretion of the full professors, of course) for their own salaries,
salaries of nontenured members, student scholarships, various expenses
and books. Will they hire a first-rate assistant professor by foregoing a
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raise in their own salaries? Will they get the best students? And will
they buy enough books for the library? Now books involve external
benefits—they are used by students as well. Shall we bring in the stu-
dents and let them allocate the funds between their scholarships and the
books? Pity the library!
So the market mechanism can be of help in some situations, but not
in others; it can improve things up to a certain point but not beyond.
What I had expected from Bailey's paper was an analysis, based both
on theory and on the actual experience in the Defense Department and
elsewhere, of the kinds of organizations, situations, and problems which
are, or are not suitable for the use of the market mechanism. Is the
synchronization of the welfare functions of the dispenser of funds and
of the decision-maker both a necessary and sufficient condition for
success? If so, the measurability of performance is not needed. But per-
haps the synchronization is not necessary, not sufficient, or neither.
These are some of the interesting questions which were unfortunately
not analyzed in the paper.
With the general tenor of Schlesinger's paper we all sympathize. Of
course, bureaucratic organizations should be shaken up from time to
time to let fresh air in. Naturally, planning for research should not be
too rigid. In the first stages of a research program there should be a
good deal of duplication, and as the program proceeds there should be
less. The program should look like a triangle, with a broad base (the
early stages), gradually tapering off to the apex. But how broad should
the base be? And how quickly should it taper off?
Following the precedent set by Eisner, let me add two thoughts of
my own. The public is always irritated by the bureaucrats, by their
seeming stupidity and rigidity. In my dealings with them (via the
Operations Research Office of the Army in 1949—51), they always gave
me the impression that faced with a choice of winning a war by break-
ing a few rules, or losing the war according to all rules, they would
inevitably choose the latter. But perhaps the system of rewards and
punishments set by their superiors, by the public, and particularly by
Congress is to blame. Called before a congressional committee, a bureau-
1Aftermy talk, John Meyer told me that Harvard professors(at least in
economics) do get a $1,000 annual allowance for officesupplies,secretarial
services, telephone, and the like, and that this system works quite well. There
was a time, he said, when salaries had been set high enough to allow professors
to make these expenditures out of their own pockets. That did not work.260 Institutional Structures and Defense Spending
crat can justify his acts, however stupid, by reference to regulations and
instructions. But suppose he does use his mind and fails. Will the com-
mittee forgive him for his use of his own judgment?
My second thought refers to our obsession with atomic weapons. True
enough, some progress since the Dulles administration has been made,
but ideas die hard. We have behaved like a person who tries to do his
daily shopping with a thousand-dollar bill. His wealth will impress all
the clerks in the store, but will he be able to buy anything? Should he
not keep the thousand-dollar bill in the safe where it belongs, and ac-
quire some change instead?
JOHN R. MEYER, Harvard University
Schlesinger's paper would seem to represent another contribution to
what one might call the second round in the organizational or planning
revolution now underway within the U.S. government and pioneered
within the DOD using concepts developed at The RAND Corporation
and elsewhere. Perhaps it would be better to call it a "reformation"
rather than a revolution. Then itis not so entirely surprising that a
mild counterreformation also seems to be in progress. Perhaps, too, it
is not surprising that some of this counterreformation is being instigated
by those very closely associated or even responsible for some of the
earlier reforms; these individuals obviously bring into the discussion
a considerable advantage in knowledge and experience.
Thus we find Schlesinger making such interesting remarks as:
In the DOD one route to further improvement would be a willingness
to abandon detailed control in [some] cases.
Agood plan should be viewed as a complicated structure to foster in-
telligent hedging...[and]not be viewed as a prescription of future
activities..
Overoptimization—bydesigning forces for the most obvious possible
wars—may be the surest way of hampering the use of our potential
power...
It[is] unwise to attempt precise planning.
All the cautions about too much optimization or planning are carefully
collated, however, with a basic endorsement of the underlying value
of the modern managerial or decision-making techniques that have been
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inger's combination of pride of achievement and caution about over-
extending the applicability of the new techniques is hardly a view shared
by Schlesinger alone. Many others even more intimately associated with
implementation of the new techniques have expressed similar views.
Schlesinger specifically contrasts two different approaches to planning:
a "Cook's tour" procedure based on "the supposition that the future
is sufficiently certain that we can chart a straight course years in ad-
vance" and "Lewis and Clark planning" which attempts to incorporate
"many alternative courses of action" though recognizing that "their
precise character in time cannot be anticipated." As noted by Schles-
inger no one can really disagree with the proposition that flexibility in
a plan is highly desirable when he does not have to pay a price for its
achievement. The trick is to achieve Lewis and Clark flexibility without
having to spend too many cold winters in Lob Pass.
What we see emerging, apparently, is a very healthy tendency to re-
assess or reevaluate and in particular to worry more about the human
problems of applying modern decision-making techniques to the manage-
ment of large organizations. In a sense, it is a return to older concerns—
to the problems studied in graduate business schools in the 1920's under
the headings of administrative practice and human relations. Let us
hope that there is no suggestion in this counterreformation that the
existence of very human problems of communication, bureaucratic
lethargy, or finding the right balance between the need for flexibility
while maintaining organizational control, represents any excuse for
suppressing logical procedures or substituting intuition for rationality.
Counterreformations like reformations can go too far. Still, it should be
quite healthy to have the problems of administrative practice or human
relations given a fresh review by many of the same individuals who
pioneered the development of optimization techniques for government
management.
Furthermore, before we proceed too far, I would like to insert at least
a few words in defense of a Cook's tour. There are planning situations
in which reasonably precise detail may be very worthwhile, e.g., situa-
tions where there is very considerable room for improvement, only
limited administrative or managerial skills, and in which a good deal of
the problem is simple "getting organized." These conditions would seem
to describe reasonably well the circumstances of several countries of
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grams of economic development. In short, Cook's tour and Lewis and
Clark planning should be viewed as polar extremes of many possible
combinations or gradations available between.
Perhaps as a consequence of the resurf&cing of old "human relations"
problems, I was continually reminded as I read Schlesinger's paper of
the story, perhaps apocryphal, that the major lesson taught by the
Harvard Business School has traditionally been "when in doubt, reor-
ganize." Schlesinger tells us that "any organizational structure needs an
occasional shaking-up or breath of fresh air" and that "McNamara has
succeeded in stirring up a very stale mill pond...[butthis] would
have come even in the absence of [the new] techniques." Indeed, at
several points in his exposition Schlesinger comes dangerously close to
suggesting that the main contribution of the new techniques has been
to provide a convenient vehicle for reorganizing a rather stodgy bureauc-
racy and, more specifically, "ruthlessly pruning" some of the more
"wasteful activities" of that bureaucracy. The new techniques are, in
short, a convenient way of constructing a brief for overthrowing an old
regime.
I have few doubts that there is considerable truth in this contention,
but I would also like to think that the new techniques have done more
than this. The really troublesome prospect raised by Schlesinger—quite
properly I believe—is the possibility that the new techniques are primar-
ily a vehicle for negation. Schlesinger never explicitly asserts this, but
I do not consider it unfair to suggest that it is implied. Specifically, he
leaves one with a very uneasy feeling that the new techniques are an
uncommonly good way of justifying an answer of "No." Not only are
the new techniques a means of ruthlessly pruning wasteful old practices
but they are also a convenient device for denying experimentation with
radically new technologies or retention of some organizational slack, of-
ten necessary for flexible adaptation to uncertain situations, particularly
within a defense organization. Schlesinger, in fact, worries that the
whole paraphernalia of new techniques may well be diverting energy
away from important long-run problems to relatively unimportant mech-
anistic pr administrative problems of the short run. We seem to need
a cost-effectiveness analysis of the cost-effectiveness tools themselves!
I must confess that I share some of his worries. Again, though, the
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of the new techniques. Rather, I would suspect that the next logical step
is not too unlike that being implemented in the management of business
enterprises. Specifically, the introduction of more flexible decision-mak-
ing techniques in which the role of accumulated experience or intui-
tion is more explicitly incorporated into the process of decision. In
short, the time would seem to be at hand when we should think about
Bayesian priors and the application of statistical decision theory to de-
fense planning—which indeed is already happening.
MERTON J. PECK, Yale University
The two papers upon which I have been asked to comment—William-
son's and Schlesinger's—are both inquiries into the centralization and
decentralization of resource-allocation decisions in the defense sector.
Economists have traditionally counted such questions as their own and,
as Schlesinger remarks, the American defense sector has the size and
complexity of the economy of a medium-sized nation.
Williamson's paper deals with the most obvious form of decentraliza-
tion—the use of private firms to develop weapons. It goes beyond view-
ing such an arrangement in terms of simply business and government,
and instead distinguishes between the Service and the higher authorities
—the OflElce of the Secretary of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget.
Such a three-sector model permits the explicit statement of what others
have noted more in passing: that the Service and contractor may form
a coalition to frustrate some of the objectives of the OSD.
Williamson treats a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract as a principal device
in this coalition. Such a contract allows the understatement of costs,
thereby enhancing the chances of project approval by OSD without mak-
ing the contractor absorb the understated costs. Uncertainty as to project
costs is the more traditional explanation of the prevalence of CPFF con-
tracts. While uncertainty is clearly present, the evidence confirms the
importance of Williamson's coalition explanation. In the twelve major
weapons projects studied at Harvard Business School, actual cost on the
average was three times the original estimates—but even more notably,
in only one of the twelve was actual cost less than the estimate.' Similarly,
Marshall and Meckling found average errors in the same range with
'Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process:
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only one of the twenty-two projects studies with costs less than planned.2
Neither sample displays an uncertainty pattern of errors where there
would be a fair proportion of underestimates.
As Williamson points out, the incentive contract in such a situation
may be as much a device for OSD to obtain the contractor's help in
realistic cost estimates as a device for encouraging cost reduction. With
the CPFF contract, the contractor's loss from a low-cost estimate is
limited to a lower fee; the fee tends to be a function of the initial esti-
mate. The government pays all of the cost overrun. With an incentive
contract, the contractor's loss from a low estimate is further increased
by his share of the cost overrun. Apparently this additional loss makes
a signfficant difference. Moore reports that, for a large sample of con-
tracts, "CPFF contracts have a cost overrun of escalation about 55 per
cent of the time..." Incentivecontracts have a cost underrun almost
75 per cent of the time.3 With the CPFF contracts, actual costs were
within 20 per cent of the initial estimate in less than two-thirds of the
contracts; for incentive contracts, 90 per cent were within this range.4
Incentive contracts may not conserve resources because of generous
initial targets, but they do represent an improvement in cost-estimating.
Lacking accurate cost estimates, much of the kind of planning Schles-
inger describes is meaningless. The objective of better cost estimates
may justify the importance OSD places on the incentive contract.
Williamson also explains CPFF contracts by noting that many of these
costs have utility to the firm; they permit the firm to increase its assets
in the form of capability for future contracts. This raises a complicated
question of public policy.
As Williamson points out, "concern for future-period capability should
also be legitimate concern (of the government) ."Buthe proposes no
way of dealing with such a concern except to urge "that research that
is explicitly directed to this purpose should be supported and on-going
or projected hardware programs should not be made to bear expendi-
2A.W. Marshall and W. H. Meckling, "Predictability of Costs, Time and
Success of Development," in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, ed.
Richard Nelson, New York, 1963.
Frederick T. Moore, Military Procurement and Contracting: An Economic
Analysis, The RAND Corporation, RM-2648-PR, June 1962, p. 49.
4Ibid.,Tables 13 and 15. Of course some of the difference must be assigned
to the fact that incentive contracts are used for the more technically certain
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tures of thissort."But future capability is more than collecting research
personnel or carrying on research projects. The way an aircraft firm
learns to build ballistic missiles is to have such a project. Thus, creating
future capability and carrying out current projects are joint endeavors.
One can visualize "learning" projects and, indeed, some developments
may fit that description. The present system does recognize these joint
cost characteristics.
And yet, the ad hoc and unconscious way in which future capability
is now created seems dubious. Just how one provides for the future, as
well as present, has to be solved in any serious agenda of weapons in-
dustry reform. Williamson fails to address this problem; surely a critical
omission with the rapidly changing technology of weaponry.
I have some further difficulties with his approach. Williamson argues
that by partitioning the weapons system into separable and sequential
tasks, conditional uncertainty may be reduced. But I am puzzled by his
contention that "each part of the task will possess a lower degree of
variability than does the whole." The larger task can, of course, net out
offsetting errors. For instance, the Army Ballistic Missile programs were
run at least partially on a task basis; as one would expect, some in-
dividual tasks produced nothing; others were remarkable successes, with
the range vastly exceeding the missile program of which they were a
part. With costs, Moore finds, "there is a tendency for actual costs to be
bunched more closely around the target cost for the larger contracts
than for the smaller contracts."Larger contracts are, of course, com-
posed of many more tasks. Contracting for each task separately may
raise the uncertainties and thus recreate the occasion for CPFF contracts.
Still the stress that Williamson places on tasks gives an analytical
clarity to the two critical issues of project management—the relative
emphasis placed on what Williamson calls sequential and contemporane-
ous timing of the tasks and the coordination and definition of tasks. My
own interpretation of these two issues, however, differs from William-
son's.
Both issues arise because weapons-development projects are largely
composed of small groups of five to ten professionals engaged in provid-
ing a certain kind of design information. This information, however,
often aids the completion of other tasks and sometimes makes certain
tasks unnecessary.
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With respect to the time sequence of tasks, one could visualize each
task done in strict sequence so that weapons would be developed by
one group working centuries. But time does matter, and so every develop-
ment has large elements of what Williamson calls the contemporaneous
as well as the sequential. Thus, I would argue there are not two radically
different development styles nor is one always optimum. Rather the
optimum mix depends on the preferred time-cost trade-off. I suspect that
past projects, partly because the services overvalued time relative to
money, have tended to be more contemporaneous than desirable. Yet
such a judgment must be a cautious one since the valid ex ante strategic
risks of delayed development are always greater than they appear ex
post.6
The foregoing view of a systems project as composed of a multitude of
individual technical tasks implies a critical role for management. The
managerial task in this situation is fivefold: (1) defining a set of tasks,
(2) deciding which tasks to undertake in which order, (3) determining
which tasks are successful, (4) insuring a flow of information between
the separate task groups, and (5) maintaining technical compatibility be-
tween subsystems. These are not easy functions. Only at a very high
level of aggregation are there established industry, skill, and technical
divisions that sort out tasks; even in generously funded projects re-
sources are limited and choices must be made; success is ambiguous,
particularly when the task itself is an intermediate input for another
task; successful development requires capitalizing upon the information
in one task as it is gained; and technical compatibility must be insured.
The prime contractor, in large part, has carried out these manage-
ment functions. It is certainly possible to substitute Service management
for contractor management. The distinguishing feature of the Army Bal-
listic Missile programs of the fifties was a closer approach to task-
oriented development than the corresponding Air Force projects. This
was successful largely because the Army, in Von Braun's group, had
a technical capability lacking in the Air Force. I suspect that since then
the Air Force technical capability has increased; hence, it can afford
to move away from the prime weapons system concept.
6would also grant the possible validity of negative marginal returns in a few
projects—that the last billion may have brought resources whose addition to
the management confusion served to increase rather than decrease completion
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Yet there are limits in centering management in the Service; even
the Army Ballistic Missile programs had to rely partly on contractors.
The greater attractiveness of private employment permits contractors to
muster greater talent pools than the government. The complexities of
coordination requires considerable decentralization to decision units be-
low the central one.
Finally, I would argue that there are limits, or at least problems, in
making various tasks equally attractive to contractors. Some tasks have
ex ante a greater probability of success and a greater utility in building
capability and, as a result, contractors place a great premium on obtain-
ing some tasks and avoiding others. When the awards are in large units,
each is a mix of attractive and unattractive tasks. If such tasks were
handed out separately, they would have to carry differential profit rates
in order to equalize their attractiveness, which itself would be a com-
plicated question. In the past the markets have cleared only because
the weaker organizations have taken the less attractive tasks, but I am
not sure this is optimum.
Schlesinger's paper is more difficult for the commentator. It deals with
questions of power and status, of knowledge and ignorance, and of
compliance and dissent; all matters on which many hold firm convictions,
and yet no one really is informed. Further, my experience is limited to
an era in the Pentagon when the old ways had obvious defects and the
new ways were unsullied by experience and untarnished by bureaucratic
limitations.
The use of the five-year planning period was intended to recognize the
future implication of present decisions. This was not being done; as a
result, the Defense Department went through a succession of financial
surprises and crises in the late fifties. To ignore the future is option deny-
ing; the Defense establishment in the late fifties gave up highly valued
options for lower valued ones whose costs were unforeseen at the time
of commitment. Schlesinger's comments indicate that this planning ob-
jective in part was unattainable, given the bureaucratic process; a five-
year conditional forecast came to be regarded as a binding contract be-
tween the Services and the Secretary of Defense. There are several pos-
sible reasons for this: (1) the Services tend to promote this interpreta-
tion when it was to their advantage, (2) the notion of tentative formula-
tion was rapidly lost as the plan was circulated downward, and (3) within
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their merits (the real reason), but by pointing to their absence in the
financial plan thereby implying its sacredness.
In any case, an approach that was' intended as a conditional fore-
cast has sometimes resulted in implied promises as to future actions,
according to Schlesinger. A strong Secretary can reverse these decisions
but still there may be costs in such reversals. Early decision then could
conflict with option preserving.
And yet the discussion of option preserving and uncertainty occurs
frequently in the statements of the Secretary of Defense and his immedi-
ate advisors. The practice in the early sixties was to keep new weapons
in the R-and-D stage, thus postponing commitments and preserving op-
tions. It may be option-preserving is still not stressed enough, as Schles-
inger implies.
Furthermore, there is always the question of what options are worth
preserving—and here the OSD and the Services may differ. Thus, what
looks like an option-preserving strategy when viewed from one side of
the bureaucratic maze, may be option denying from another. Schles-
inger points this out, "Leaders tend to be interested in their options."
I turn finally to the issues Schlesinger places under bureaucratic prob-
lems. The conflict between civilian systems analysts and the military
is certainly the titillating aspect of the McNamara era. But it cloaks a very
real issue of civilian leadership and option preservation on the part of
the Secretary of Defense. Without his own staff, a Secretary can create
choices either by vetoing and hoping for a resubmission closer to his
preferences, or by playing off one Service against another. The former
tends to be somewhat ineffective; the latter is partially nullified by re-
luctance of the services to trespass on one another's market. These de-
vices do work after a fashion; the pre-McNamara Secretaries used both;
the nay-saying by imposing stringent over-all budgetary limits and the
Service rivalry by favoring the Air Force which advanced the strategic
ideas then in favor.
Still, a strong Secretary will want a more effective way of option crea-
tion. This requires a staff. And since the purpose of such staffs is to
provide the Secretary of Defense options other than those proposed by
the Services, they are bound to be unpopular.
While a Secretary of Defense could become a prisoner of the preju-
dices of his own staff, there are built-in avenues for Service opposition
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for intelligent dissent is even a greater problem within the military." Here
the OSD staff may play a special role as a conveyor of minority Service
views. This kind of role would further aggravate civilian-military ten-
sions; to the Services it may look like the unmanly act of tale bearing.
And the Services may believe that professional military opinion should be
unified; that it is confusing for a Secretary to have several views. Yet
diverse opinions increase the options for civilian leadership.
The problem of dissent as an aid to effective decision-making within
the Pentagon or any other large bureaucracy has yet to be fully examined.
The literature on decision-making is largely barren of the discussion of
kinds, sources, and amounts of useful dissent. In this respect, Schles-
inger's paper is novel. There is well established literature on the value
of dissent in the political process at large, not only for its libertarian
contribution, but also as an aid to more rational decision-making. But
with more and more decisions being made by bureaucracies there must
be corresponding value to dissent here as well.
D. 3.ROBERTSON,The University of Glasgow
I am not an expert in the economics of defense, though, like most
people, I am interested in defense planning because of its human im-
plications. My comments will, therefore, be general in character.
I should like to speak briefly first on the purposes of defense policy,
secondly on some differences which I detect in the economic analysis
of British defense expenditure as compared with that of the U.S.A.,
and thirdly on each of the papers of Bailey, Schlesinger, and Williamson.
The Context of Defense
I would categorize the possible purposes of expenditure on armed
strength in contemporary circumstances in seven ways, and argue that
only the last three of these are relevant to our discussion. (a) Armed
strength may be needed to maintain internal order. This has no more
than marginal relevance for Britain or the U.S.A. (b) The purpose
might be merely to provide a display of military pomp and circumstance
for the delight of tourists and the locals. Though we seem from time
to time to make rather a lot of this in Britain, it is not a very important
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pare our forces to meet the conditions of the nuclear age wholly on the
basis of defensive armaments without any offensive power. This is a
somewhat unreal possibility, since for it to be warranted antinuclear
defenses would need to be so perfect that they would themselves deter
an aggressor from trying to make any headway against them, or defeat
his efforts if he tried. Otherwise we would neither provide an effective
defense nor an effective deterrent. The appropriate mixture of de-
fensive and offensive armaments will alter from time to time reflecting
both policy and technology, but whether the intentions of policy include
aggression or are wholly directed to defensive or deterrent purposes, a
mixture of defensive and aggressive armaments would seem to be an
inevitable requirement. (d) The nuclear resources of the armed forces
might be developed mainly for offensive purposes with the intention
of going to war and destroying the enemy without being destroyed one-
self. I hope I am right in assuming that nuclear aggression is not part
of the policy of the U.S.A. or of the Western alliance as a whole.
The three versions of defense policy which do appear to me to be
relevant to contemporary discussion are the following:
1. We might develop our nuclear capability so as to be able to feel
some assurance that if we were attacked we would be able to destroy
the enemy without being destroyed ourselves, but wait for such an
attack before acting. I would call this a policy of active nuclear defense.
2. We might develop our resources of nuclear weapons both for de-
fense and attack for the sole purpose of effective deterrence, holding to
the view that we can preserve the "balance of terror" and rule out an
actual nuclear war.
3. We have a responsibility to have resources available to fight
limited wars; and both Britain and the U.S.A. have actually found them-
selves engaged in such conflicts at various times in the postwar period.
The resources needed for this type of war are conventional in the sense
that they rule out the use of major nuclear weapons. There is, of course,
some debate on whether limited wars are compatible with the use of
tactical nuclear weapons, but the balance of nonmilitary opinion ap-
pears to be that the risk of using them in limited situations is too great.
In practice the context of limited wars tends to be that of "colonial" wars
both in the locations in which such wars occur and in the complicated
political and military objectives and situations to which they give rise.
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inga direct confrontation of major powers on their home ground—for
exam., pie in Europe. The use of nuclear weapons of a tactical sort in
the odd corners of the earth in which such struggles are likely would
seem to be of mixed value on a number of grounds, so that the
descriptions "conventional" and "colonial" probably apply to the types
of military resources required as well as to the type of struggle.
Almost everybody would agree on the need for the last of these (con-
ventional-war capacity) and the majority opinion in both countries seems
to accept the need for the second (nuclear deterrence)—that is cer-
tainly my personal view. I want to differentiate this second position,
however, from the first (active nuclear defense). I suggest to you that
few people in Britain can feel that the first—actually finding ourselves
in a nuclear war (however innocently)—will result in anything other
than complete or almost complete, annihilation. May I remind you that
the geographical dispersion of the British economy is small by your
standards—about the distance from San Francisco to Los Angeles! I,
together with almost half the population of Scotland, live less than forty
miles from the major Polaris submarine base at the Holy Loch. Even a
single moderately successful nuclear attack on such an obvious target
would be likely to cause us to lose further interest in the outcome of the
arithmetic of the success or failure of the war effort; and other populous
parts of Britain have other potential targets in close proximity. From
the point of view of the B.ritish civilian, it is difficult to regard the bal-
ance of advantage in active nuclear defense as anything other than an
"academic" question. I would not deny that some military experts may
have sufficient confidence in defensive strength to dismiss this as an un-
duly pessimistic position, but with stakes as high as those at issue here
some pessimism is warranted. I would, therefore, like to rule out active
nuclear defense as well as nuclear aggression as a possible outcome of
policy. You may be thinking that as an expression of hope this is unex-
ceptionable, but that such a result can hardly be unilaterally guaranteed.
I agree; but the realization that a nuclear war is not an acceptable policy
is worth constant reiteration to ensure that the bias of the minds of the
policy-makers does not drift unconsciously into the feeling that, if peace-
ful or limited-war strategies should fail and a nuclear war be forced upon
us, we shall always be able to win it.
My thoughts on this matter do not lead me to suppose that those parts
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advantages of one form of nuclear strategy and defense expenditure as
against another are a waste of time, since they are concerned to deal
with a situation that is itself "unthinkable." A strategy of deterrence re-
quires calculations of the "returns" to defense expenditure, and I would
accept the idea that it is necessary for economic analysts to act out the
game as though action were possible, to assess the effectiveness of a
proposed item of defense expenditure as a deterrent. On the other
hand, it is always important to avoid any tendency, for reasons of brevity
or because the point is thought to be automatically assumed by the
reader, to omit any reference to the gamelike or hypothetical character
of the debate, and this does not always seem to be done in the American
literature. I would also suggest that accepting deterrence and limited-
war capacity as the only possible policies influences the balance of ad-
vantage among alternative expenditures. The need for effective limited-
war capacity is greater if there is to be no risk of drifting into a situa-
tion which cannot be resolved short of all-out war. The case for multi-
purpose weaponry improves in the deterrence/limited-war combination
as against the active-nuclear-defense context. If resources are held back
for active nuclear defense at the expense of conventional-war capacity,
the result may be to bring the former nearer. Propaganda, and even
publicity, for the extent of available resources of a deterrent character,
are in order for deterrence more than for an active-defense assumption.
From this point of view the recent exchange of statements on the extent
of nuclear resources is an appropriate development of policy, and the
build-up of U.S. power in conventional armaments which has been
brought about by the Vietnam situation may be regarded as a long-run
desirable shift in the balance of U.S. defense expenditure. (I hasten to
add that 1 am not in any way offering a comment on the war in
Vietnam itself—that is neither my purpose nor my business.)
Some Differences for Britain
There are three respects in which, it seems to me, analysis of British
defense expenditure may differ from that appropriate to the U.S.A.
1. In some ways our problems of weapons acquisition can be founded
on better estimates of their probable cost. As the major partner in the
alliance, with the economy which has the greater capacity for develop-Defense Contracts: Incentives & Performance 273
ment of new techniques, the U.S.A. is more likely than Britain to put
resources into new-weapon development, and less likely to buy such
weapons from us. It is, therefore, more frequently possible for us to
choose between independent research and development, and production
of new weapons and buying overseas—from the U.S.A. Problems of
terms and delivery can naturally arise in the uncertain nature of weapon
development, but the U.S. is likely to be willing to quote its terms for the
supply of new weapons, and thus our developmental costs can be re-
lated to an external estimate, and our own estimates of the "returns"
from a new system can also be put against those derived from outside.
(Such a decision, however, raises a new uncertainty, which merits at-
tention, that of the extent to which British industry may suffer from the
loss of the associated benefits of a large program of research and develop-
ment, and the economy as a whole suffer from the loss of the production
program, both in terms of the consequences for particular industries—
for example, the aircraft industry—and the balance of payments effects.)
2. We have fewer resources in total, and need conventional arma-
ments reflecting our world commitments, and so we have to give con-
siderable weight to a "conventional" range of choices and decisions in
determining our defense budget. While there are, of course, plenty of
uncertainties about the possible needs to be met by conventional forces,
the routine obligations for garrisons and "fire-brigade" forces can prob-
ably be assessed with greater certainty than wholly hypothetical nuclear
needs, and to this extent our decisions can be reached with the benefit
of more data. Additionally, the weapons required for these purposes are
more familiar, and there are fewer uncertainties in development and
production costs. (There are, nevertheless, the usual penalties for failure
to relate returns to outlay and to make the necessary choices: for example,
it is now being alleged that we have both decided to maintain forces
east of Suez and held our expenditure below the level needed to achieve
this together with our other stated objectives.)
3. We are able to some extent to proceed in assessing the proposed
level of our defense budget by deciding on the level of expenditure that
we are prepared to face, and then allocating that amount to the various
objectives that we wish to serve. We ought, of course, to assess the needs
of armed forces for limited-war purposes, especially insofar as our needs
in this respect are likely to differ from those of the alliance as a whole.274 institutional Structures and Defense Spending
We cannot hope, however, to be independently fully adequate in provid-
ing an effective deterrent against nuclear attack, and for this we have to
rely on the strength of the alliance and in particular on the U.S.A. On
the other hand we are very much implicated in the deterrent policy, and
in a matter of such importance to us we would like to have a say in
the policy actually followed by the alliance. Our interests in nuclear
weaponry might be put as providing in some small way for our own
protection while staying in the game and seeking to influence the more
important players. (I am conscious that some would argue that we have
no hope of being effective in our influence, while others might claim
that we can be effective in deterrence on our own—but the way I have
put the matter represents a middle-ground opinion to which I would
adhere.) With these objectives we have to fix a minimum level of de-
fense expenditure which provides for our decisions on conventional
forces and makes some provision for nuclear capacity: to that extent our
defense expenditure reflects our commitments rather than the reverse.
But the amount of expenditure on nuclear resources required to meet
the need for influence and minimum capacity is,it may be argued, a
variable which will defeat precise quantification—though its size may be
more closely defined in the course of negotiations with our allies and in
particular with the Americans (and, indeed, the same process will oper-
ate to refine the scale of commitment to provide conventional military
resources to the common purposes of the alliance). I would argue that
this set of circumstances forces our defense budget up to the scale it
has attained in the postwar period, but allows us to operate to a degree
on the basis of choosing a level of expenditure and then allocating it
while maintaining to our allies that this is the most we can afford.1
1Thisand the preceding point are related to the remarks I made on the
Olson and Zeckhauser paper. They argued that defense for the allies is a collec-
tive good, and that policy for the alliance ought to reflect the economies of scale
to be achieved from specialisationin supplying the collective needs. While
accepting this argument in part, I would contend that defense in the alliance
(like health expenditure—an analogy on which some of their argument is based)
is both a collective good and one which satisfies individual needs. The nearest
to a pure collective item is deterrence from nuclear attack, though even here
allies may wish to take part in the "production" to make sure that they are fully
party to the decisions. Conventional-war capacity serves a number of different
purposes, and these are not necessarily the same for each ally. (For example, the
U.S. did not share the load of our Cyprus troubles or in Malaya.) Thus the
extent to which allies will specialise their conventional war capacity is limited,
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Price Mechanism and Planning in Defense
Both Bailey and Schlesinger are concerned with questions of the use of
market mechanisms and of planning in defense, and I have one com-
ment on each of their papers.
Bailey, in examining the actual use of pricing techniques in U.S. de-
fense policy, may appear to the outsider to underemphasize the influence
of marginalism, reflecting economic thinking and the contributions of
economists, in the determination of choices between alternative uses for
military resources. I quite accept that this is far from the same thing
as allowing the free play of market forces in defense, but it is none the
less an important contribution. Even if the sole outcome of the work of
economists in defense planning were to produce an increased tendency
to ask what we get for what we spend, this would be a valuable re-
sult. The point might be illustrated by a comment on Bailey's remark
at an early point in his .paper that the economy and the operation of
the armed forces move away from the market mechanism intimeof war.
In one sense that is very true—decisions are not simply a reflection of
price movements. But at the same time an economy on a full war footing
—such as the British economy from 1940 to 1945—is forced in its
planning to take the greatest cognizance of the economic logic of choice.
The objectives can be stated with some clarity and the range of objec-
tives is narrowed, both in the defense sector where the "shadow boxing"
of prewar strategy gives way to actual situations, and in the civilian
sector where much of the immense range of consumer choices is set
aside. The mechanism of choice is operated by a more tightly knit group
of those responsible for the war effort. The resources can be reckoned
and aligned to the objectives. The needs of the civilians can be, and have
to be, tailored to the needs of the war, and the objectives for them
are reduced to matters of health and morale. The reconciliation of
resources and objectives is not put to the test of the market, but it is
very much a product of marginal thinking none the less.
Schlesinger, in discussing the need to "hedge" against uncertainties,
appears to suggest that the problem is the same for civilian and military
examples. He illustrates his thesis by the case for constructing a wider
underpass on a new highway so as to be prepared for the possibility that
additional lanes will be required later. This may be warranted expendi-276 Institutional Structures and Defense Spending
ture, but it need not be so. The highway planner, though he may well
make mistakes in his predictions, can project trends in the demand for
his product, and can set out with considerable clarity the time sequence
of possible developments, though be will be less certain of the precise
timing. He may then go on to produce a reasoned estimate of the return
to be expected from additional expenditure now as a precaution against
future needs. The military planner seems to me to have much less
ability to produce a time-flow of expected returns from nuclear weapons,
and to this extent, at least, the task of planning in the civilian sector
is much the easier.
incentive Fee Contracts
Williamson criticises "cost-plus" contracting on the grounds that it al-
lows the authorities to claim that contractors have been kept under con-
trol because their profit is fixed without actually securing for the spend-
ers of the money any real control over production efficiency. He also
points to the tendency for such a contractual method to build up extra
production resources in the hands of the producers as an unplanned con-
sequence of their method of payment. He proceeds from these legitimate
criticisms to consider the merits and demerits of the obvious alternative,
which requires the introduction of some element of incentive to ef-
ficiency on the part of the producers. He suggests, however, that the
present form of incentive-fee contract used in U.S. defense spending
lacks the necessary amount of specificity and control, and in con-
sequence recommends "a shrinkage in the range of discretion available
to the Services and their defense contractors" to be obtained by greater
partitioning of the tasks allocated to the contractors. The merits of this
proposal appeal to me and I want to offer only one possible criticism
before ending by drawing what I think is a useful comparison with the
incentive payment of labor.
The risk of greater specificity is that efficiency is lost by missing op-
portunities for economies of scale and reducing the long-run commit-
ment of producers to the needs of defense. The case of research and
development expenditure is different from that of production, since in
the former there are more prospects of returns to small-group working.
An apparent duplication of research and development effort may yield
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production stages, though even here it is difficult to push the case for
disaggregation too far. Economies of scale are usually to be found in
production. The need to maintain specificity and detail in contracting
need not, however, necessarily imply small production units, since the
contracts fixed on the basis of detailed pricing, including an incentive
element, can then be let out to the contractors in linked parcels, each
item of which is separately priced. Williamson's case is really one for
more care in pricing and task definition as well as incentive, and the
argument for more control need not also be an argument for separating
out the actual establishments being given the work. (It is however, also
an argument for more expertise in the detailing of contracts among
Government employees, and it may be worth mentioning in passing that
there may be grounds for the government's undertaking some—though
not all—of its production in establishments under its own control, in
part, as a means of developing detailed knowledge of costs.)
Labor economists have some considerable acquaintance with the snags
of incentive-pricing since this is a familiar form of payment of labor,
whether in the shape of piecework, where the workers are offered a price
per unit of production, or as a time-allowance scheme, in which—with
variations—the workers are allowed a particular time to do a job and
are paid for some or all of the time that they saved against the time
allowed, as well as for the time they have actually taken to do the
work. An incentive-fee contract for defense purposes would seem to be
rather close in form to the fixing of an incentive basis of payment for
workers in a jobbing (or "one-off") production situation or in small-batch
production. The manager trying to assess the price he is prepared to
pay a worker or a group of workers in such a situation has the basic
difficulty that the task in question has, either wholly or in part, not
been carried out before. There is a strong temptation to be so keen on
the incentive idea as to rush into a somewhat arbitrary guess at a price
or time. This procedure leads to disenchantment:if the price fixed
turns out to be too generous the workers receive an unnecessarily large
payment and need not work very hard to obtain it, but if the price
fixed is too low then the workers force a revision on the management.
There has, therefore, been an increasing tendency to avoid such large
prices and to shift towards disaggregating the task to be carried out and
pricing it in smaller portions. Alternatively, managements—realizing that
the incentive basis of payment requires more and not less active super-278 institutional Structures and Defense Spending
vision—have moved towards relying more on detailed supervision and
less on the pricing system itself to obtain efficient work from their
employees. They have indeed sometimes actually reverted back to pay-
ment on the basis of time worked, without an explicit incentive in the
weekly rate but with a progressive over-all payment policy. The moral of
this for defense contracting is exactly the point Williamson makes—that
incentive payment requires detail in its supervision and pricing if it is
to be effective, and that, therefore, the prior need is for "limiting dis-
cretionary opportunities."